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ON THE HISTORY OF DISEASE-CONCEPTS:
THE CASE OF PLEURISY
Adrian Wilson
University of Leeds
It is, I believe, uncontentious to suggest that concepts of disease — both in general 
and with respect to particular ailments — have changed and developed historically in 
the long history of the Western medical tradition. And it is obvious, too, that diseases 
(taking that term in its widest sense, to embrace illnesses at large) were-and-are 
precisely the distinctive concern of medicine. On principle, therefore, we might 
expect that the history of disease-concepts plays a central part in the historiography 
of medicine, just as the histories of celestial, physical and vital concepts do in 
the historiographies of the respective natural sciences; yet paradoxically, this is 
far indeed from being the case. That strand of medical history which focuses on 
medicine’s cognitive content has devoted far more attention to anatomical and 
physiological knowledge than to pathology; the history of medical practice is often 
written without reference to the disease-categories by which past practitioners 
apprehended the illnesses of their patients; and as we shall see, histories of actual 
diseases have tended to treat their objects as timeless entities, thereby blocking off 
the very possibility of considering disease-concepts historically.
This paper proposes that the history of disease-concepts deserves far more 
attention than it has traditionally been accorded, not least because this theme is 
relevant to the full range of medical history’s existing concerns, from anatomy to 
medical practice. I shall proceed in three stages. Part 1 sketches the historiographic 
state of play with regard to disease-concepts. Part 2, which makes up the bulk of 
the paper, seeks to illustrate the possibility of treating such concepts historically by 
means of an example, namely the disease of “pleuritis” or “pleurisy”; I shall trace 
the shifting meanings of this term ﬁrst amongst the ancients and then, on a very 
selective basis, in the early-modern period. Finally Part 3 will meditate brieﬂy on 
the results of this case-study, returning to the general historiographic theme and 
suggesting some points of wider application.
1. HISTORIOGRAPHY
There is already a substantial tradition of scholarship which treats concepts-of-
disease as historical products, and which has traced their histories in a series of 
particular cases. That tradition could be said to begin in the 1930s and ’40s, with 
three pioneering studies: Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and development of a scientiﬁc 
fact, which stressed that “syphilis” was a historically-changing concept;1 Owsei 
Temkin’s The Falling Sickness, a history of concepts of epilepsy from ancient 
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to modern times;2 and Georges Canguilhem’s The normal and the pathological, 
a critical dissection of the mid-nineteenth-century shift in the deﬁnition of the 
pathological, which was written as a doctoral thesis in the 1940s and was published 
in 1966.3 The tradition was renewed in the 1970s and ‘80s, most explicitly by the 
school of “social-constructivists”4 but also by various other medical historians 
working from a range of different perspectives;5 in the 1990s it is still alive and 
well, as various recent studies attest.6 And this now substantial body of work 
has consistently demonstrated the historicity of disease-concepts — not just for 
putatively “soft” diseases such as epilepsy, chlorosis7 and hysteria,8 but also for 
diseases which all observers regard as having a physical, bodily basis. This can be 
illustrated with reference to four examples: syphilis (arguably the classic case, since 
Fleck historicized it as long ago as 1935); asthma (which has often been assigned 
a “psychosomatic” component, but which has always been seen as thoroughly 
“somatic” as well); coronary thrombosis; and Bright’s disease.
(1) The historicity of “syphilis” was the fundamental premise of Fleck’s Genesis 
and development of a scientiﬁc fact: the book opened with a little history of “how 
the modern concept of syphilis originated”,9 and Fleck went on to argue that every 
relevant development in knowledge entailed a change in the very deﬁnition of 
what we know as “syphilis”. This impact of knowledge upon disease-concepts was 
particularly marked in the cases of the two great discoveries of the early twentieth 
century — the microorganism Spirochaeta pallida (ﬁrst detected in 1905) and the 
Wassermann reaction (ﬁrst reported in 1906, gradually reﬁned into a serological 
test).10 Of the Wassermann reaction, which was the central concern of his study, 
Fleck wrote that it “redeﬁned syphilis”,11 and indeed he argued that the very success 
of that reaction as a diagnostic test required such redeﬁnition of the disease.12 And 
with respect to the discovery of the spirochaete, he remarked:13
The statement, “Schaudinn discerned Spirochaeta pallida as the causative 
agent of syphilis” is equivocal as it stands, because “syphilis as such” does not 
exist. There was only the then-current concept available on the basis of which 
Schaudinn’s contribution occurred, an event that only developed this concept 
further. Torn from this context, “syphilis” has no speciﬁc meaning....
The reason that Fleck thus historicized “syphilis” was that he was seeking to 
problematize scientiﬁc knowledge and its making, using the Wassermann reaction 
as his case-study. I shall shortly have occasion to look more closely at Fleck’s 
conception of knowledge; for the moment, what commands attention is the fact 
that he depicted the “modern concept of syphilis” precisely as a concept, that 
is, as a human product.
(2) Asthma, John Gabbay showed in a paper of 1982,14 began in the ancient world 
as a symptom; it changed its nature in the Renaissance, becoming a disease in its 
own right, and one located in the abdomen; subsequently, in the eighteenth century, 
it moved its abode to the thorax; it was repeatedly reinterpreted throughout the 
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nineteenth century; and it went on being transmuted until the mid-1970s. In short, 
the entire course of asthma’s long history was a story of change, to the very eve of 
the time that Gabbay was writing.
(3) Coronary thrombosis has a history of a very different kind, since this disease 
was only discovered, or invented, in the 1920s; but from Christopher Lawrence’s 
study it emerges that coronary thrombosis was and is just as much a constructed and 
contingent “entity” as asthma.15 For instance, coronary thrombosis was stabilized 
only with great difﬁculty, if indeed it was stabilized at all;16 its relation to ECG 
ﬁndings (its supposed clinical test) was consistently problematical;17 and Lawrence 
went on to suggest that it was disappearing as a clinical category in the 1990s. It 
seems, then, that coronary thrombosis is perhaps a disease-concept with an end as 
well as a beginning; and just this pattern is revealed by my ﬁnal example.
(4) What was called “Bright’s disease” — that is, a particular kind of dropsy which 
Richard Bright distinguished in 1827 — has been elegantly interrogated by Steven 
Peitzman.18 We thus learn that “Bright’s” was not one but three diseases; that its signs 
and symptoms were always variable, as were its putative causes (cold according to 
Bright himself, microbes according to a later generation, immunological changes 
still later); and that in the twentieth century “Bright’s disease” went into terminal 
decline. By about 1950 “Bright’s” had given up the ghost, ironically yielding place 
to the older category “nephritis”, which was succeeded by “renal failure”, which 
in turn gave way, in the age of dialysis, to “end-state renal disease”;19 and each of 
these new names designated a different clinico-pathological concept, for all that 
these various concepts overlapped.
The collective import of these and other such studies has been that concepts-of-
disease, like all concepts, are human and social products which have changed and 
developed historically, and which thus form the proper business of the historian. 
Yet this insight has been held in check by another approach, in which diseases 
throughout history have been identiﬁed with their modern names-and-concepts. 
Under this very different rubric, responses to diseases, both on the part of individual 
patients-and-doctors and on a larger scale in the form of such political measures as 
quarantine, are permitted to vary historically; but this historiographic permission 
is withheld from diseases themselves, since those diseases are all taken to coincide 
with their respective modern concepts. And the effect of this approach is to construct 
a conceptual space in which the historicity of all disease-concepts, whether past 
or present, has been obliterated. Past concepts of disease have simply been written 
out of existence; and the historicity of modern disease-concepts (or what are 
taken to be modern ones) is effaced, because those concepts have been assigned 
a transhistorical validity.
These two approaches have now been running side-by-side for some decades; 
yet the tension between them has attracted remarkably little comment.20 Since one 
chief purpose of the present paper is to bring that tension to light, it will be worth 
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comparing the different ways in which these two traditions have approached a 
single disease. The most convenient example to choose is the disease which came 
to be known as “syphilis” — for this was precisely the disease-concept which Fleck 
historicized in his Genesis and development of a scientiﬁc fact, and it is also the 
theme of a highly-regarded history-of-disease study, namely Claude Quétel’s Le mal 
de Naples (1986), translated in 1990 as History of syphilis.
Quétel’s Le mal de Naples is (as its introduction puts it) a study of “syphilis as 
a cultural phenomenon”.21 Seen strictly within its own terms of reference this is an 
admirable work, which beautifully captures many of the cultural responses evoked 
over the centuries by what was variously called the “mal de Naples”, “great pox”, 
“morbus Gallicus”, “morbus venereus”, “lues venerea”, or “syphilis”. But Quétel’s 
terms of reference are precisely what is at issue here, for his inquiry rigorously 
excludes from consideration the various concepts associated with this motley 
welter of names. The reason for this exclusion is that one such concept, namely 
the modern concept, has been privileged as the factual mirror of Nature: Le 
mal de Naples is entirely premised upon retrospective diagnosis. Early-modern 
disease-descriptions are consistently read through the conceptual grid of the modern 
concept of “syphilis”; as Quétel depicts it, Schaudinn’s Spirochaeta pallida was 
(or rather, is) simply “the syphilis microbe”, and the Wassermann reaction yielded 
a diagnostic test for an implicitly unchanged “syphilis”. And as a result, the little 
that emerges concerning disease-concepts presents a series of paradoxes which 
are in radical tension with the book’s premises and are accordingly left entirely 
unresolved. For instance, the very name “syphilis” presents a riddle: coined by 
Fracastoro in the early sixteenth century, it lay dormant until the eighteenth century, 
when it somehow displaced “the great pox” and other terms which had been used for 
the previous two hundred years; yet this profound shift of terminology emerges only 
in asides.22 Again, the “great pox” included, as one of its symptoms, a “gonorrhoea” 
(that is, a ﬂux-of-seed),23 which in the early nineteenth century came to be seen 
as a separate disease;24 yet Quétel barely notices that this puts in question his own 
identiﬁcation of the “great pox” with “syphilis”.25 In sum, disease-concepts lie 
beyond the conceptual horizon of Le mal de Naples; they enter Quétel’s discourse 
only to be instantly dismissed from consideration.
Ironically enough, it turns out that this very approach to the history of diseases had 
already been described, criticized and explained in Fleck’s Genesis and development 
of a scientiﬁc fact. In order to bring out this point, it will be necessary to outline 
Fleck’s larger theses concerning the nature of scientiﬁc knowledge.
We saw earlier that Fleck sought to problematize both the content and the making 
of scientiﬁc knowledge. What we must now notice is that in the pursuit of this 
aim, Fleck consistently depicted the development of such knowledge as a social 
process. “Not only the principal ideas but also all the formative stages of the syphilis 
concept”, he wrote, “are the result of collective, not individual, effort”;26 and he 
went on to portray scientiﬁc knowledge in general as embedded in a “thought 
style”, associated with a speciﬁc “thought collective”. Thus a “scientiﬁc fact” such 
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as the Wassermann reaction was “a stylized signal of resistance in thinking ... by 
the thought collective”.27 Equally important, the subsequent maintenance of any 
such fact, that is, its historical stability, required “social reinforcement”;28 and 
Fleck proceeded to elaborate the social mechanisms by which historically-produced 
knowledge was maintained and stabilized.29 Here Fleck’s key concept was what he 
called “popular science” or “science for nonexperts”: that is, a drastically-simpliﬁed 
version of scientiﬁc knowledge, whose aim is “the apodictic valuation” of “a certain 
point of view”.30 In “popular science”, the uncertainty which is characteristic 
of scientiﬁc research has been replaced by certainty; the need for arduous proof 
is eliminated by creating a “vivid picture”; and the historicity of concepts is 
necessarily eliminated, for certain of those concepts are assigned the quality of 
eternal truths. This erasure-of-history, Fleck explained, has its own particular 
rhetorical mechanisms: in particular, the collective character of knowledge-making 
is obliterated and is replaced with a mythical, individualized picture,31 involving 
a Manichean conﬂict between “the ‘bad guys’, who miss the truth, and the ‘good 
guys’, who ﬁnd it”.32 But the key point is that the historical development of concepts 
is thereby erased. And in the particular case of disease-concepts, this means 
that the modern concept is extended backwards in time: the disease as presently 
conceived is seen as a permanent entity,33 and it is assumed that it can be diagnosed 
retrospectively on the basis of earlier texts which in fact conceived that disease 
in radically different terms from those underlying the modern concept.34 In sum, 
Fleck not only demonstrated the historicity of “syphilis”; he also showed that the 
contrary picture — the view which eternalizes the modern concept of “syphilis” 
— is intelligible as a necessary by-product, within “popular science”, of the 
modern concept itself.
Le mal de Naples is obedient in every particular to the “popular-science” view 
of syphilis and its history, exactly as Fleck sketched it. As we have seen, the very 
foundation of Quétel’s approach is the assumption that the “mal de Naples”, the 
“great pox”, and so on, are all to be identiﬁed with one another under the sign 
of the modern concept of “syphilis”, and this entails that the actual meanings of 
these various disease-concepts are suppressed. Inevitably, therefore, Quétel’s study 
scarcely considers the making of medical knowledge.35 And to the extent that the 
development of medical knowledge is brought into view, it is depicted in strictly 
teleological terms (for instance, as a “step in the right direction”36) and is rigorously 
individualized37 — precisely in line with the dictates of the “popular-science” 
conception of knowledge as delineated by Fleck.
The profound and pervasive contrast between the approaches of Fleck and 
of Quétel stems from a radical difference in conceptions of the cognitive, of 
the social, and of their interrelationship. Speciﬁcally, Fleck saw knowledge as 
socially-constituted, thereby placing the cognitive within the social, whereas Quétel 
has drawn a rigid boundary around the realm of the social and has placed knowledge 
outside that boundary. It should also be observed that Fleck went to some trouble 
to argue for his conception, whereas Quétel simply assumes his conception — and 
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symptomatically, Quétel nowhere mentions Fleck’s work. The ﬁnal irony is that 
this self-limitation radically restricts the scope of the responses-to-syphilis which 
Quétel allows himself to depict, thereby impoverishing the very argument which he 
was striving to develop, namely the vision of “syphilis as a cultural phenomenon”. 
But what is signiﬁcant in the present context is that Quétel’s founding act of 
excluding the cognitive from the social has systematically obliterated the historicity 
of concepts-of-disease.
This contrast is by no means conﬁned to the individual ﬁgures of Fleck and 
Quétel, or to the speciﬁc case of syphilis: on the contrary, it runs through the whole 
historiography of medicine. We might well describe it, using Fleck’s own terms, 
as a difference in “thought styles” — speciﬁcally, “thought styles” concerning the 
nature of disease-concepts. By way of a convenient shorthand, I shall term these two 
thought styles ‘the historicalist-conceptualist approach’ and ‘the naturalist-realist 
approach’. Their deﬁning characteristics can be summarized as follows:
(a) The historicalist-conceptualist approach takes concepts of disease as objects 
of historical study: this is the tradition which I have illustrated by the studies 
of Fleck on syphilis, Gabbay on asthma, Lawrence on coronary thrombosis, and 
Peitzman on Bright’s disease.
(b) The naturalist-realist approach excludes disease-concepts from historical 
investigation, because it takes modern disease-concepts as the mirror of natural 
reality: this is the countervailing tradition of which I have taken Quétel’s study 
of syphilis as a specimen, and which is also illustrated by many other studies of 
responses-to-diseases and of historical epidemiology.
Now as I have already remarked in passing, the tension between these two 
approaches has scarcely been noticed.38 And the reason for this, I suggest, is simply 
that the naturalist-realist approach to diseases has played and continues to play a 
hegemonic role in the historiography of medicine. That is to say, there has been no 
confrontation between the two approaches, because the naturalist-realist approach 
has been dominant. This makes intelligible the otherwise paradoxical fact that 
historians of medicine — in contrast to historians of science, from Thomas Kuhn 
onwards — have shown very little interest in Fleck’s Genesis and development of a 
scientiﬁc Fact.39 The indifference of the historiography of medicine to Fleck’s work, 
then, reﬂects a deeper problem: that the historicalist-conceptualist approach to the 
history of diseases has remained subordinate in medical history.
But perhaps the most telling index of the dominance of the naturalist-realist 
approach is that its assumptions pervade even some of the leading attempts to 
historicize medical knowledge in general, and apprehensions of disease in particular. 
I shall illustrate this by considering four classic works, spanning almost half a 
century; remarkably enough, we shall see in each of these cases that the historicity 
of disease-concepts has actually been written out.
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(1) My ﬁrst example is the very book which is usually cited as the paradigmatic 
example of the history of a disease-concept:40 Owsei Temkin’s The Falling Sickness, 
published in 1945. Now Temkin’s approach to the history of epilepsy was admirably 
and rigorously historical, for he wrote in his preface that “we must above all 
ﬁnd out what was meant by epilepsy”, and “we must take the past seriously 
and try to understand it”. But in the very act of deﬁning this approach, Temkin 
placed severe boundaries upon its application — for he conﬁned his vision of the 
historiography of disease-concepts to those diseases whose bodily riddles medicine 
had not (in his view) solved:41
A history of epilepsy seems a premature, perhaps even a doubtful enterprise. 
There is no unanimity about the range of the concept of epilepsy, and the nature 
of the disease is yet obscure....
 All these doubts and questions suggest that a history of epilepsy cannot be 
written in the manner in which, for instance, a history of tuberculosis might be 
approached. In the latter case, we have deﬁnite and well-founded knowledge of 
the nature of the disease. This knowledge we can apply as a critical standard to 
the past and can separate the true from the false. At present such a procedure 
is not possible with regard to epilepsy, for we may easily decry as false what 
the future will prove to be true....
 This being the case, there seems but one way left. We must above all 
ﬁnd out what was meant by epilepsy, what symptoms were attributed to it, 
how it was explained and how treated. That means we must take the past 
seriously and try to understand it.
That is to say, the attempt to “ﬁnd out what was meant by epilepsy” and to “take 
the past seriously” was only appropriate because epilepsy was still not adequately 
understood. And conversely, Temkin assumed that when it came to such a disease 
as “tuberculosis”, its history should be written strictly in naturalist-realist terms — 
deﬁning “tuberculosis” along the lines which Koch had put forward in 1882,42 and 
thereby obliterating the history of all the relevant concepts, including the concept of 
“tuberculosis” itself. This of course was precisely the anachronistic approach which 
Fleck had explained and criticized ten years earlier.
(2) A classic of a very different kind was Foucault’s Naissance de la clinique, 
which was published in 1963 and was translated into English in 1973 as Birth 
of the clinic.43 It may seem strange to suggest that Birth of the clinic blocked off 
the possibility of historicizing concepts-of-disease, for that work has widely been 
perceived precisely as having historicized medical knowledge, and speciﬁcally 
clinical knowledge,44 and in one sense this was indeed the thrust of the book — 
as was only to be expected from a pupil of Canguilhem’s. Yet in fact Foucault 
so constructed his theme as to erase the very possibility of writing the history 
of disease-concepts, and this in two ways. In the ﬁrst place, the threshold which 
he depicted medicine as crossing with the “birth of the clinic” was a transition 
not within knowledge, but on the contrary from non-knowledge to knowledge. 
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Concepts-of-disease before la clinique were consigned to “the language of fantasy”; 
concepts-of-disease inaugurated by la clinique “made it possible ... for the patient’s 
bed to become a ﬁeld of scientiﬁc investigation”; the shift from the one to the other 
consisted simply in the fact that “language has turned into rational discourse”.45 
Thus the historicity of disease-concepts consisted in one event and one event only, 
namely the transition itself — a transition which was neither more nor less than the 
move from darkness into light, from invisibility to visibility, from “fantasy” and 
“imaginary investments” to “scientiﬁc investigation” and “rational discourse”.46 And 
on neither side of this divide was there any further story to be told.47
Secondly, in line with the larger “archaeological” vision which he was then in 
the process of constructing, Foucault conceived this transition in language, this 
“mutation in discourse”,48 as strictly syntactic in nature: that is, as concerned not 
with the meanings of words but purely with their mutual arrangement. Having 
asked at the outset “From what moment, by what semantic or syntactical change, 
can one recognize that language has turned into rational discourse?”,49 he went 
on to argue — at the climax of his preface — that the semantic dimension was 
irrelevant and that the “mutation in discourse” could be identiﬁed at the level 
of syntactics alone:50
But is it inevitable that we should know of no other function for speech 
(parole) than commentary? Commentary questions discourse as to what it 
says and intended to say ... in other words, in stating what has been said, 
one has to re-state what has never been said. In this activity ... is concealed 
a strange attitude towards language: to comment is to admit by deﬁnition an 
excess of the signiﬁed over the signiﬁer; a necessary, unformulated remainder 
of thought....
 To speak about the thought of others, to try to say what they have said 
has, by tradition, been to analyse the signiﬁed. But.... Is it not possible to make 
a structural analysis of discourses that would evade the fate of commentary by 
supposing no remainder, nothing in excess of what has been said, but only the 
fact of its historical appearance? ... The meaning of a statement would be deﬁned 
not by the treasure of intentions that it might contain ... but by the difference that 
articulates it upon the other real or possible statements....
Now in fact this formulation rested upon an “attitude towards language” no less 
“strange” than that of commentary itself: for in invoking “what has been said” 
as his object, Foucault simply reintroduced the very problem which he had been 
attempting to evade, namely the problem of meaning. The paradox of language, 
then, could not be resolved — for all of Foucault’s efforts — by taking a stand on 
the side of syntax, of structure, of arrangements of words, and against meaning, 
intention, interpretation; on the contrary, Foucault’s own claim that la clinique 
“turned” language into “rational discourse” rested precisely on a posited semantics, 
on the notion that language was “open[ed] up ... to a whole new domain”, on 
the conception of “a new alliance between words and things”.51 Thus the purely 
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structural analysis of language which Foucault claimed to envisage was in the 
strictest sense a contradictory enterprise.52 Yet for all this, his conception carried 
powerful messages: that a line could be drawn between the meanings of words and 
the modalities of their arrangement, and that the former (semantics) was strictly 
subordinate to the latter (syntactics). And this formulation precluded any history of 
actual disease-concepts — for such a history would necessarily take the meanings of 
those concepts, that is, the semantic dimension of language, as its theme.
(3) In 1978 there appeared what was to become perhaps the best-known essay in 
the genre of “social constructivism”: Karl Figlio’s study of chlorosis in nineteenth-
century Britain.53 Subtitled “the social constitution of somatic illness in a capitalist 
society”, Figlio’s paper argued that the disease of chlorosis, or the “green sickness”, 
was anchored in class relations. At ﬁrst glance it seems that Figlio here historicized 
and relativized the concept of “chlorosis”, and that he did so by presenting a 
narrative account of the rise and fall of that concept; yet these appearances are 
highly deceptive. In fact the paper offered no such narrative at all; it paid only the 
most cursory attention to the meaning of “chlorosis”; and it left wholly in suspense 
the question as to whether what changed historically was the concept of chlorosis 
or the disease itself. Indeed, as we shall see, the effect of Figlio’s approach was to 
obscure the very distinction between what I am calling the historicalist-conceptualist 
approach and the naturalist-realist approach.
Chlorosis was classically a disease of young women. Figlio began by arguing 
that chlorosis was “a physical illness”,54 which was “limited to a deﬁnite life-span”: 
it “emerged in the sixteenth century; it was ﬁrst described clearly in the early 
eighteenth century and became common in the nineteenth century; it peaked around 
mid-century and was rare by the 1920s”. In 1928, when it was being recognized 
that chlorosis had strangely disappeared, Henry Sigerist had argued that “the history 
of chlorosis is the history of young girls in society”;55 and Figlio’s interpretation 
was an elaboration and refinement of Sigerist’s view. Figlio summarized his 
own analysis as follows:56
Capitalism developed increasingly by calling on youthful female labour. To 
the extent that the working-class girl was drawn into the labour process, the 
characteristics of the non-working girl were exaggerated, ﬁrst by deﬁning 
adolescence as a new child-like stage corresponding to the age of intensive 
labouring in the working class, and then by throwing into ever sharper relief the 
image of a-sexual, non-working, delicate femininity. Chlorosis reinforced this 
now polarized, dual nature of the youth become adolescent.
Despite these various narrative gestures — “a deﬁnite life-span”, “developed”, 
“ﬁrst”, “then”, “now” — a narrative content was precisely what Figlio’s essay 
lacked. The rise of chlorosis was not discussed at all. The period of its ﬂourishing 
was depicted as entirely homogeneous, both with respect to the disease itself 
(examples were plucked indiscriminately from the 1780s, the 1830s, the 1860s, 
the 1880s and 1906)57 and with respect to nineteenth-century British capitalism 
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(speciﬁc capitalist industries were scarcely identiﬁed, and there was no mention 
of, for instance, Chartism, empire, or compulsory education). But the most 
remarkable anti-narrative feature of the essay was that the decline of chlorosis 
— the very feature of its history that Sigerist had emphasized — was explicitly 
bracketed off from consideration at the very outset of the argument; and the 
form of this move was highly revealing. Here is how Figlio disposed of the issue 
(but with my emphases):58 
Explanations of its disappearance vary, but authors did reject the possibility 
that chlorosis vanished simply because it had received another name.... To go 
into these reasons in detail would get us into the risky business of retrospective 
diagnosis. But more important even than the explanations proposed to interpret 
its decline is the fact that the need met by attaching a medical label, with 
all the consequences that followed, was now either met in some way, or 
no longer existed.
Thus Figlio left it strictly indeterminate (“either ... or”) whether concepts of disease 
had changed, or whether the physical disease of chlorosis had disappeared. The 
same ambiguity recurred in the body of the essay: sometimes Figlio hinted that 
capitalism had led to the very category “chlorosis”,59 sometimes he suggested 
that biological changes were involved,60 and he never attempted to resolve the 
tension between these two interpretations. Indeed if anything, Figlio inclined 
towards the biological explanation — since in the passage just quoted, “the risky 
business of retrospective diagnosis” was invoked as the reason for not discussing 
the decline of chlorosis. 
Although this ambiguity seems surprising, it is intelligible in the light of Figlio’s 
purposes. All that mattered was that chlorosis could somehow be tied to “capitalist 
society”: it was a matter of indifference whether this putative link was constructed 
by way of the concept or by way of the disease itself. And precisely for this reason, 
Figlio’s essay had very little to say about the actual concept of chlorosis, or about 
its history. The ironies are considerable, for in fact chlorosis had undergone a 
dramatic mutation in the early nineteenth century (that is, at the beginning of the 
period with which Figlio was concerned), and this was linked to a larger and highly 
consequential shift of medical concepts. In the eighteenth century, chlorosis was 
a “cachexia”, that is, a corruption of the blood;61 in the early nineteenth century, it 
became an “anaemia”; and what brought about this transformation, or at least made 
it possible, was that the concept of “anaemia” itself — a concept which, unlike that 
of “chlorosis”, is still with us — was invented at that time.62 Thus attention to the 
concept of chlorosis rapidly opens a much wider horizon of historical inquiry. And 
conversely, the reason that Figlio failed to disclose such possibilities was precisely 
that he never brought chlorosis into focus as a concept.
(4) In 1992 Charles Rosenberg and Janet Golden published a collection of essays 
entitled Framing disease.63 The volume was notable for including two papers which 
I have already cited as leading examples of the historicization of disease-concepts: 
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Lawrence’s study of coronary thrombosis and Peitzman’s essay on Bright’s 
disease. Yet as Rosenberg’s introduction made clear, the book’s very title was 
designed to marginalize, indeed to erase, the signiﬁcance of those two essays 
and of the historicalist-conceptualist tradition as a whole. In a pivotal passage, 
Rosenberg spelt out the reasons for the collection’s title, making it clear that 
diseases were to be seen as “framed” precisely in order that that they should not 
be seen as “constructed”:64
In the following pages I have, in fact, avoided the term social construction. 
I felt that it has tended to overemphasize functionalist ends and the degree 
of arbitrariness inherent in the negotiations that result in accepted disease 
pictures. The social-constructionist argument has focused, in addition, on a 
handful of culturally resonant diagnoses — hysteria, chlorosis, neurasthenia, 
and homosexuality, for example — in which a biopathological mechanism 
is either unproven or unprovable. It invokes, moreover, a particular style of 
cultural criticism and particular moment in time — the late 1960s through the 
mid-1980s — and a vision of knowledge and its purveyors as rationalizers and 
legitimators, ordinarily unwitting, of an oppressive social order. For all these 
reasons, I have chosen to use the less programmatically charged metaphor 
“frame” rather than “construct” to describe the fashioning of explanatory and 
classiﬁcatory schemes of particular diseases.
The effect of this passage was to identify the metaphor of “construction” with 
its particular instantiation as “social construction”, that is, with the genre to which 
Figlio’s study of chlorosis belonged — whence the allusion to that disease. And 
this move obliterated from view the essays of Lawrence and of Peitzman in the 
volume itself, not to mention Gabbay’s study published ten years earlier and 
Fleck’s Genesis and development of a scientiﬁc fact — all concerned with diseases 
which are generally regarded as involving “biopathological mechanisms”, each 
of them demonstrating the contingent and constructed character of the disease-
concept in question, none of them advancing “a vision of knowledge and its 
purveyors as rationalizers and legitimators ... of an oppressive social order”. 
Rosenberg concluded:
Biology, signiﬁcantly, often shapes the varieties of choices available to societies 
in framing conceptual and institutional responses to diseases: tuberculosis 
and cholera, for example, offer different pictures to frame for society’s 
would-be framers.
An accompanying footnote explained what such “different pictures to frame” 
meant: “The very different modes of transmission imply different relationships to 
relevant ecological and environmental factors.”
Despite what Rosenberg was suggesting, the new metaphor “frame” was every 
bit as “programmatically charged” as the discarded metaphor “construct”. For of 
course the purpose of this “framing” imagery was to do away with the notion of 
construction, and to depict diseases as natural entities — tuberculosis and cholera 
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being taken as examples. The historically-constructed categories “tuberculosis” and 
“cholera”, complete with their “modes of transmission”, that is, strictly following 
the post-Kochian deﬁnition of these diseases,65 were assigned a timeless existence. 
Consequently, the scope of the historical was drastically restricted, in the standard 
manner of the naturalist-realist approach: “responses to” diseases were permitted to 
vary historically, but concepts of disease were not.66 (And most of the studies in the 
book implicitly echoed this conception: that is, rather than exploring the historicity 
of disease-concepts in the manner of Lawrence or Peitzman, they treated diseases 
as real entities identical with their names,67 and limited themselves to the various 
cultural “responses” which diseases, so construed, had evoked.) Yet ironically 
enough, the metaphor of pictures-and-framing undermined itself; for tuberculosis 
and cholera were depicted as “offer[ing] ... pictures” — and “pictures” are of 
course human-made. Thus Rosenberg’s own rhetoric inadvertently conceded just 
what he was trying to deny:68 that diseases are not simply “biological” entities in 
Nature but human constructs, as of course are the very concepts of the “biological” 
and the “biopathological”.
To sum up, the naturalist-realist approach to the history of diseases has been 
remarkably tenacious: it comfortably survived the translation of Fleck’s book 
into English, and it has even pervaded some of the major attempts to historicize 
medical knowledge. Consequently, the history of most disease-concepts still awaits 
investigation, as indeed does the history of the concept of “pathology” itself. And 
we have still to take the measure of Fleck’s point, that the supposed timelessness 
of diseases, and the associated conception of medical knowledge, are themselves 
precisely human constructs.69
2. THE CASE OF PLEURISY
To adapt to the present context what Steven Shapin once wrote about the sociology 
of scientiﬁc knowledge,70 one can either debate the possibility of the history of 
disease-concepts or one can go out and write such a history. In the previous section 
I sought to demonstrate the possibility; here I shall attempt to do it, albeit within 
certain limits. By means of a case-example I hope to show that investigating the 
history of disease-concepts yields rich rewards, and also that such an exercise does 
not require a technical medical competence, but simply calls for a modicum of 
exegetical care. The example I have chosen for this purpose is pleurisy, or to give 
it its original and ancient name, pleuritis.
“Pleurisy” — in inverted commas, that is, concepts of pleurisy — is a particularly 
eligible subject for such a study, for several reasons. In the ﬁrst place “pleurisy”, 
like “asthma”, belonged and belongs to the entire history of the Western medical 
tradition. Its birth coincided with the birth of Western medicine itself, for it featured 
(as “pleuritis”) in several of the Hippocratic texts; it was considered by all the 
subsequent leading medical authors of Antiquity; it reappeared in the medical 
writings of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment; in the epoch of la clinique it 
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was discussed extensively by Laennec, who found for pleurisy its own distinctive 
auscultative sound; and people are diagnosed as suffering from “pleurisy” today. 
Thus pleurisy offers an example which should speak to historians of Western 
medicine working on any and every period. Secondly, it so happens that the ﬁrst 
episodes in the history of “pleurisy” have already been charted by Wesley D. Smith, 
whose pioneering study of “pleurisy” (strictly speaking, “pleuritis”) in the ancient 
texts considerably facilitates my own task.71 Thirdly, “pleurisy” — unlike “asthma” 
— has always been seen (at least, in all the texts I have consulted) strictly as a 
bodily ailment, never as involving any “psychosomatic” component. Thus if, as 
I hope to show, “pleurisy” changed historically throughout the Western tradition, 
this mutability of the concept cannot be ascribed to any supposed “softness” on 
pleurisy’s part: it always was as deﬁnite and bodily a disease as any ailment from 
which patients were seen as suffering. And yet a fourth reason for taking an interest 
in pleurisy concerns the particular modes of anatomical localization. Speciﬁcally, 
one school of thought held that pleurisy was located in the membrane lining the ribs: 
that is to say, not in an organ but rather in what would come to be designated, in the 
“age of Bichat”,72 as a tissue. Thus in one dimension of its history, pleurisy serves as 
an example — and as we shall see, a remarkably precocious one — of precisely that 
kind of localization which supposedly deﬁned la clinique.
In line with the programmatic aims of the present paper as a whole, my discussion 
of “pleurisy” will be indicative rather than deﬁnitive. I shall not be telling a 
connected story, but merely depicting some salient episodes; thus what follows is 
to a history-of-”pleurisy” much as a series of snapshots is to a ﬁlm. Further, the 
approach adopted here will be strictly “internalist” and textual. That is to 
say, I shall make no attempt to explain the various shifts of meaning which will 
emerge; rather, those shifts will be presented as offering a series of problems 
for further investigation. In short, the aim of this section is not to write the 
history of “pleurisy” — for as will become clear, that would require an entire 
book — but simply to demonstrate that “pleurisy” had a history of which an 
account could be written.
I shall begin with “pleuritis” in the ancient texts; here, thanks to Wesley Smith’s 
help, it will be possible to give a more or less comprehensive overview. My discussion 
will then leap forwards to the Renaissance, from which point it will be necessary to 
be much more selective: I shall focus on just three authors — Vesalius, Baglivi and 
Morgagni — who between them will conduct us from the early stages of the medical 
Renaissance to the eve of la clinique. My emphasis throughout will be upon the 
deﬁnition of “pleuritis” or “pleurisy”, even though several of the texts which I shall 
be considering were chieﬂy concerned with other matters: for instance, Vesalius’s 
Venesection letter (the only work, amongst those to be discussed, which was devoted 
speciﬁcally to pleurisy) dealt with therapeutics. In different texts, therefore, we shall 
ﬁnd the deﬁnition of “pleuritis” variously foregrounded and taken-for-granted; and it 
will emerge that this variety of focus is revealing in itself.
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2.1. ANCIENT CONCEPTIONS OF PLEURITIS
We can schematically but conveniently distinguish three epochs within the ancient 
roots of Western medicine:
(i) the Hippocratics of the ﬁfth century B.C., of whose works some have survived;
(ii) the Alexandrians of the third century B.C. and their “dogmatic” followers, whose 
writings have survived only in quoted “fragments”; and
(iii) the authors of the early Christian era, from whom (as from the Hippocratics) 
we have a number of extant works: principally Soranus (relayed through Caelius 
Aurelianus), Aretaeus, and above all Galen.
In his important and path-breaking essay on this subject, Wesley Smith has 
surveyed the accounts of “pleuritis” in (i) and in (iii), and has reconstructed 
the doctrines that were advocated in (ii).73 What follows is much indebted to 
Smith’s incisive study.
(i) In the Hippocratic writings, although there was no single picture of “pleuritis”, 
the various different accounts had this in common, that they deﬁned the disease 
— if they deﬁned it at all — symptomatically. Many of the texts simply took the 
deﬁnition of “pleuritis” for granted, concentrating instead on prognostics,74 on 
therapeutics,75 or on speculative humoral pathology.76 But pleuritis was described 
in Affections,77 in Diseases II ,78 and in Diseases III,79 and these three works gave 
closely-overlapping deﬁnitions of its characteristic symptoms. We may take as an 
example the description in Diseases III: 80
When pleuritis arises, a person suffers the following: he has pain [οδυνη] 
in his side [πλευρην], fever and shivering; he respires rapidly, and he has 
orthopnoea [that is, he can breathe only when in an upright posture].81 He 
coughs up somewhat bilious material the colour of pomegranate-peel, unless 
he has ﬁssuring, then he coughs up blood too, from the ﬁssures. In sanguinous 
pleuritis the sputum is charged with blood....
Of these various symptoms, the pain in the side was the critical element — which 
is just as we would expect from the etymology of the word “pleuritis”. “Pleuron” 
meant “side” or “rib”; the sufﬁx “-itis” seems to have meant an “affection”, 
“afﬂiction”, “disease” or “trouble”.82 Thus “pleuritis” was a disease named after 
its chief symptom, namely pain-in-the-side — whence the fact that this symptom 
alone was named in those other Hippocratic texts which mentioned pleuritis without 
explicitly deﬁning it,83 while yet another work (Regimen in acute diseases) used the 
phrase “pain in the side” and the word “pleuritis” more or less interchangeably.84 Yet 
while this was the common core of the various usages in the Corpus Hippocraticum, 
those usages varied in at least two ways. In the ﬁrst place, one description, namely 
that in Diseases II, located the pain of pleuritis not in the side but instead “along the 
spine and in the chest” — as if the “pleur-” was here designating “ribs” rather than 
“side”. However, as we shall see in a moment,85 even Diseases II went on to revert to 
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the normal usage, that pleuritis was pain in the side. We may take it, therefore, that 
pain in the side (rather than in the ribs) was the standard meaning.
A second and more signiﬁcant source of variety within the Hippocratic texts 
was that “pleuritis” was seen sometimes as a single disease, and at other times as 
comprising, in effect, a family of different though related diseases. Indeed Diseases 
III itself, whose description of pleuritis I have quoted, deployed both of these usages 
in succession:86 for that description was already in the process of distinguishing 
between “bilious” and “sanguinous” forms of pleuritis, and the text went on to 
speak of further “varieties” of pleuritis: ﬁrst “dry pleuritises without expectoration”; 
then “pleuritis in the back”; and ﬁnally still further “pleuritises”, in which “the 
sputum is clean, but the urine bloody” and “sharp pains extend along the spine to 
the chest and groin”. Similarly Diseases II, having located the pain of pleuritis 
“along the spine and in the chest” as we have seen, immediately described “another 
pleuritis” involving “pain in the side and sometimes around the collar-bone”, 
followed by yet “another pleuritis” in which the patient has “pain” in “his side” — 
thereby, we may notice in passing, transferring the pleuritic pain from the patient’s 
“spine and chest” to its more typical location in the patient’s side.87 Although this 
pattern of usage seems inconsistent, it simply reﬂected the very origin of the term 
“pleuritis”; for different “pleuritises” were different constellations of symptoms 
which had in common pain in the side (or perhaps, taking Diseases II into account, 
in the ribs). Thus the term “pleuritis” was symptom-based: a “pleuritis”, we might 
say, was what the patient reported to the doctor in the ﬁrst place.88
(ii) A very different conception of pleuritis was advanced by the various so-called 
“dogmatic” medical writers who ﬁrst appeared around 300 B.C., and chieﬂy in 
Alexandria: that is to say, the anatomists Herophilus and Erasistratus together with 
their teachers89 and followers. For all of these authors — so we learn from the 
much later testimony of Soranus, as recounted still later by Caelius Aurelianus 
— deﬁned pleuritis not symptomatically but anatomically.90 Yet while the various 
“dogmatics” agreed over this radical shift of the mode of deﬁnition, they diverged 
as to its practical content; for amongst them (so Soranus/Caelius informs us) two 
very different opinions were advanced. Some, including Herophilus, saw pleuritis 
as affecting the lung; others, including Erasistratus, placed that affection not in the 
lung but instead in “the membrana hypezocota which girds the sides internally” 
— that is, in the “undergirding membrane” which lines the ribs. Those of the 
former opinion were presumably faced with the question as to how pleuritis was 
distinguished from that afﬂiction of the lungs called peripneumony;91 and at least 
one of these authors — namely Herophilus — offered an answer to that question: 
pleuritis, he suggested, arose when peripneumony was complicated by fever.92 
It seems that these two different anatomical interpretations of pleuritis, the one 
locating it in the lung, the other placing it in the membrana hypezocota, generated 
lively debate in the ancient world; for Soranus/Caelius gave an extended account 
of the arguments which had been advanced on each side. In addition, there was 
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probably also a third party in this debate, a party which Soranus/Caelius did not 
report — namely the “empirics”, who argued that the location was irrelevant and 
that only therapeutics mattered.93 We might well guess that the “empirics” deﬁned 
pleuritis just as the Hippocratics had done, but unfortunately this information is 
lost to us. Nevertheless this much is plain: that the “dogmatics” all conceived 
pleuritis anatomically (while locating it variously in the lung and in the membrana 
hypezocota), in sharp contrast with the symptomatic conception of the earlier 
Hippocratics.
Further, there was at work here another shift; for in at least one respect the 
dogmatics gave pleuritis a new symptomatic content, over and above what was 
included in the Hippocratic writings. Speciﬁcally, the dogmatics observed that 
pleuritic patients characteristically have difﬁculty in lying on one particular side 
— not, curiously enough, on the side of the pain, but rather on the unaffected 
side.94 Strikingly, the two contending anatomical schools of thought agreed on 
the presence of this symptom95 — though they described and interpreted it in 
different ways, corresponding to their respective conceptions of the seat of the 
disease. Those who placed pleuritis in the lung (Herophilus and others) depicted 
the trouble-in-lying-on-the-unaffected-side as “difﬁculty in breathing”;96 but those 
who located pleuritis in the “undergirding membrane” (Erasistratus and others) 
portrayed the trouble-in-lying-on-the-unaffected-side as “pain”.97 And each school 
had its own distinctive anatomical account of the cause of that symptom — which 
was precisely why Soranus/Caelius, writing some centuries later, included it in 
his summary of the debate between them. Now what we must observe is that this 
symptom had not been mentioned in any of the accounts of pleuritis within the 
Hippocratic Corpus — despite their detailed descriptions of symptom-patterns, 
of prognostic signs, of different varieties of pleuritis. Moreover, there is no 
particular reason to assume that the much later testimony of Soranus/Caelius 
has exhausted the catalogue of such additional symptoms. It is therefore entirely 
possible that the “dogmatics” added to “pleuritis” yet further symptoms — 
perhaps, like the difficulty-in-lying-on-the-unaffected-side, common to both 
anatomical interpretations, perhaps speciﬁc to one interpretation or the other. 
This is of course entirely conjectural; yet we should not on that account rule 
it out as a possibility.
(iii) From the early Christian era we have discussions of pleuritis by at least three 
authors: in the ﬁrst century by Soranus (relayed, as has been mentioned, through 
Caelius Aurelianus);98 in the second century by Galen, in several of his works,99 and 
by Aretaeus of Cappadocia in his treatise on acute diseases.100 Although Soranus, 
Galen and Aretaeus were writing largely independently of one another, they were 
all heavily inﬂuenced by the writings of the preceding dogmatists; and while 
their orientations and emphases differed, they reveal a clear common core. For all 
three of them interpreted pleuritis anatomically, and speciﬁcally, they all followed 
what we may call the “Erasistratean” line, that is, that pleuritis was seated in the 
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membrane lining the ribs. True, the anatomical orientation was much less prominent 
in Soranus/Caelius than in Aretaeus or Galen, for Soranus regarded the state of 
the whole body (“stringent” or “relaxed”) as the key issue in the interpretation 
of diseases,101 and he deployed this whole-body conception in his description of 
pleuritis just in his accounts of other acute diseases. Nevertheless Soranus also 
gave some weight to anatomical localization, to different degrees in different 
diseases;102 and as it happened, he was particularly sympathetic to this approach 
in the case of pleuritis. As he summed up this point (from the Latin text of 
Caelius Aurelianus):103
But when we see a case of pleuritica, let us view it not as a simple affection 
of the side but as an affection of the whole body accompanied by acute fever. 
For fevers involve the whole body. We shall be right, however, if we say 
that the membrana hypezocota is more particularly affected, for it is there 
that the pains are centred.
Thus even Soranus accepted a measure of anatomical localization for pleuritis — 
whence the fact that his account of the competing deﬁnitions of the disease did not 
mention Hippocrates,104 whereas his subsequent discussion of competing treatments 
began with Hippocrates.105 Further, the particular localization which Soranus 
endorsed was in the membrana hypezocota, not in the lung: thus the “Erasistratean” 
line had come to prevail over the “Herophilean” line. And in each of these respects 
Aretaeus and Galen, writing in the next century, were to take the same view as 
Soranus before them, simply going further than Soranus in their commitment to 
anatomical localization. In short, as Wesley Smith has well put it, there was by 
this time “a general understanding” as to the nature of pleuritis:106 it was to be 
interpreted anatomically, and its particular seat was in the membrana hypezocota, 
the “undergirding membrane” which lined the ribs.
I shall consider the content and signiﬁcance of this anatomical conception 
in a moment; ﬁrst, however, we must pause to notice a further development on 
the symptomatic front. We have already seen, when considering stage (ii) of our 
three-epoch schema, that the anatomical approach inaugurated by Herophilus and 
Erasistratus brought with it a new symptom of “pleuritis”, namely difﬁculty in lying 
on the unaffected side; and I suggested that other symptoms might well have been 
added to “pleuritis” at that time. Now that we have reached stage (iii) of our schema, 
another such symptom has indeed emerged; and as we shall see, it is possible that 
this, too, had been added at the time of Herophilus and Erasistratus.
The new symptom is the quality of the pain associated with “pleuritis”. With 
one minor exception, which I shall note in a moment, the Hippocratic texts had all 
described pleuritis merely as pain-in-the-side, without distinguishing that pain in 
any way save by its location; but as Wesley Smith observes, the pain of pleuritis 
has now, in the writings of the early Christian era, become a pain of a particular 
kind.107 Soranus/Caelius describes it as “pricking, throbbing, and burning”;108 
Aretaeus mentions “acute” pain (speciﬁcally in the clavicles) and “acrid heat”; 
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Galen describes the pleuritic pain as “nygmatodes”, that is, “pricking”,109 or in 
Professor Smith’s gloss, as “sharp or piercing as though from needle jabs”. Now 
there are some further complexities here, for Soranus, Aretaeus and Galen described 
and interpreted this pain in slightly different ways.110 Nevertheless they agreed in 
assigning to the pleuritic pain a particular quality, a certain sharpness or intensity; 
and this was almost wholly new as compared with the discussions of “pleuritis” 
in the Hippocratic texts. True, Diseases III had mentioned “sharp pains” [‘δυναι 
τε ‘ξεαι].111 But even there, this sharpness of the pain was by no means seen as 
characteristic of “pleuritis”, since these sharp pains were located not in the side 
but “along the spine to the chest and groin” — and this type of pain was associated 
only with one variety of “pleuritis”, not with “pleuritis” in general. In short, even 
if the quality of the pleuritic pain as described by Soranus, Aretaeus and Galen was 
somehow derived from this little passage in Diseases III, it had radically changed 
its status since the days of the Hippocratics, for it had now been installed as a 
deﬁning characteristic of pleuritis.
Thus the sharpness of the pain as a deﬁnitive symptom of “pleuritis” was added 
after the writing of the Hippocratic corpus. But just when was “pleuritis” endowed 
with this new quality? On this question, as with so many issues concerning ancient 
medicine, we have no clear evidence; and much depends on what we make of the 
precise description of the pleuritic pain. Galen’s “nygmatodes” was apparently 
inherited from Archigenes, the leading Pneumatist who was active around 100 
A.D.;112 thus if Galen’s term is taken as deﬁnitive, then this quality of the pleuritic 
pain may well have been a relatively late discovery.113 But if we adopt a looser 
criterion, assimilating together the various descriptions of that pain supplied by 
Soranus, by Galen and by Aretaeus, there are grounds for assigning its discovery to 
the earlier dogmatics, and speciﬁcally to those who placed pleuritis in the membrana 
hypezocota.114 It is therefore possible that the quality of the pleuritic pain dated 
from the era of Herophilus and Erasistratus, just as the difﬁculty-in-lying-on-the-
unaffected-side did — though this is merely a hypothesis.
Although it is frustrating that this new symptom, the sharpness of the pleuritic 
pain, is so difﬁcult to pin down historically, there is one sense in which this hardly 
matters. For whether we ascribe it to the earlier dogmatics or to the medical writers 
contemporary with the Roman empire — that is, to stage (ii) or to stage (iii) 
of our schema — the adding of that symptom conﬁrms and extends what we 
already learnt from considering the difﬁculty-in-lying-on-the-unaffected-side: 
namely, that the shift from a symptomatic deﬁnition of pleuritis to an anatomical 
deﬁnition was accompanied by changes in the symptoms themselves. And as 
we shall see, this is intelligible enough, once we focus on what the anatomical 
conception of pleuritis entailed.
For a closer look at that anatomical conception in late Antiquity we may turn 
from Soranus to Aretaeus — for as we have seen, Aretaeus and Galen were more 
closely wedded to anatomical localization than was Soranus, and it happened that 
Aretaeus’s treatise on acute diseases offered a more detailed and explicit account 
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of pleuritis than did any of Galen’s extant works. It is a fair presumption that the 
earlier Alexandrians, the originators of the anatomical approach — from whom 
we have no extant writings on the subject — had written along analogous lines 
to what we shall be seeing in Aretaeus. For our purposes, therefore, Aretaeus’s 
interpretation of pleuritis can stand in lieu of that of those dogmatics (Erasistratus 
et al.) who had ﬁrst placed this disease in the membrana hypezocota, though of 
course we have no such surrogate for the alternative (Herophilean) interpretation, 
that pleuritis was seated in the lung. Here are the opening sentences of Aretaeus’s 
description of pleuritis:115
Under the ribs, the spine and the internal part of the thorax as far as the clavicles, 
there is stretched a thin strong membrane, adhering to the bones, which is 
named hypezokos. When inﬂammation [phlegmone] occurs in it, and there is 
heat with cough and parti-coloured sputa, the affection is called pleuritis. But 
all these symptoms must harmonize and conspire together as all springing from 
one cause; for such of them as occur separately from different causes, even if 
they occur together, are not called pleuritis. It is accompanied by acute pain 
of the clavicles; acrid heat; lying down on the inﬂamed side easy ... but on the 
opposite side painful.... It is attended with dyspnoea, insomnolency, anorexia, 
ﬂorid redness of the cheeks, dry cough, difﬁcult expectoration of phlegm, either 
bilious, or deeply tinged with blood, or yellowish; and these symptoms observe 
no order, but come and go irregularly....
This picture of pleuritis, when compared with the descriptions of pleuritis in the 
Hippocratic texts, reveals several interlinked changes which together amount to a 
profound transformation of medical categories. First and fundamentally, although 
pleuritis is still identiﬁed symptomatically (for of course only symptoms can be 
observed), it is now deﬁned anatomically: speciﬁcally, as an inﬂammation in the 
membrane called the “hypezokos”. That is to say, a word which had originally 
referred to an experience of the patient — pleuritis, pain in the side — is now 
being used to designate a change in an anatomical structure; and signiﬁcantly, that 
structure is the starting-point of Aretaeus’s entire description of pleuritis. 
Second, the pain-in-the-side has strangely receded from view: Aretaeus assumes 
that pleuritis is an affection of the side (as becomes clear when he remarks that lying 
on the inﬂamed side is easier), and furthermore that it involves pain, yet he does not 
mention the pain-in-the-side itself. And the reason is that he has absorbed this, the 
experience of the patient, within the category “inﬂammation” [phlegmone]. Hence 
the fact that Aretaeus implicitly refers to that inﬂammation as a “symptom”:116 
although this denomination is strictly illogical — for such inﬂammation of an 
interior structure is a medical inference rather than a presenting symptom — it is 
in fact entirely consonant with Aretaeus’s redeﬁnition of pleuritis. The patient’s 
experience (pain) has been transformed into a process (inﬂammation), and has 
been remapped from a part of the experienced body (the side) onto an internal 
structure (the membrane called hypezokos); as we shall see in a moment, it has 
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thereby changed its status, becoming the cause of the illness; and yet, for all 
this, it also retains traces of its original nature, namely the fact that it is a pain, 
and is thus a symptom.
Third, precisely because the pain-in-the-side has ceased to be deﬁnitive, “pleuritis” 
no longer embraces several different diseases, or a family of diseases; rather, it is a 
single condition. In this new conception it would be inconceivable to speak, as some 
of the Hippocratic texts had done, of “another pleuritis” (Diseases II), or of “some 
pleuritises” (Diseases III), each with different clusters of symptoms.
Fourth, as the corollary of this shift, the core symptomatic content has expanded: 
pleuritis is now characterized not by a single symptom (pain in the side) with 
which other and variable symptoms are loosely associated, but on the contrary by a 
precise constellation of symptoms. As we have seen already, this has involved the 
introduction of new and hitherto unsuspected symptoms: the piercing quality of the 
pain, the difﬁculty in lying on the unaffected side.
Finally, it is not the mere concatenation of these symptoms which establishes 
that unity which is “called pleuritis”; on the contrary, Aretaeus insists that this 
unity derives from the (supposed) common causation of those symptoms. And this 
completes the conceptual circle within which the new concept is inscribed; for of 
course the cause is neither more nor less than the deﬁning anatomical event, namely 
the inﬂammation of the hypezokos.
In short, the entire conception of disease has been radically redeﬁned. The 
installation of the new, anatomical element, and above all its privileging as the site 
of deﬁnition — these have necessitated a rearrangement of the old, symptomatic 
elements; or to use a different metaphor, what seem to be the same “moves” (the 
identiﬁcation of certain symptoms) are in fact being played within a new and 
different “game”.117 Indeed, it is perhaps only now that the word ‘symptom’ is 
appropriate, or that it gains the sense which we today confer upon it: that is, as 
something which reveals the disease, yet which is not that disease, and which thus 
in fact reveals the disease only obliquely.118 It would seem that the new ‘game’ 
involves a decisive shift of power from the patient to the doctor; for pain-in-the-side 
was an experience of the patient, whereas “inﬂammation of the hypezokos” is 
not something which the patient could conceivably experience or describe. Yet 
the patient’s experience has by no means been swept aside; indeed, quite the 
contrary. For the anatomically-oriented writers have observed pleuritic symptoms 
which were precisely within the realm of the patient’s experience, yet which 
the Hippocratics had ignored: the stabbing quality of the pain, the difﬁculty in 
lying on the unaffected side.
n view of this sharp disparity between Hippocratic “pleuritis” and the “pleuritis” 
of late Antiquity, we may well wonder what Galen had to say about “pleuritis”; for 
Galen adhered to the anatomical deﬁnition of that disease, yet he was concerned 
throughout his writings to portray his own medicine as continuous with the medicine 
of Hippocrates, repeatedly eliding the awkward problem that the Hippocratic texts 
were largely silent on matters anatomical.119 Thus pleuritis was one of many themes 
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which required Galen somehow to efface the differences between Hippocratic 
medicine and “dogmatic” (that is, anatomical) medicine. How did he tackle this 
task in the particular case of pleuritis? Within Galen’s various commentaries upon 
Hippocrates, there were two particular points at which pleuritis was discussed: 
with respect to the Aphorisms and Regimen in acute diseases. In each case I give 
ﬁrst the pertinent Hippocratic passage and then Galen’s commentary upon it as 
translated by Wesley Smith.
(1) Aphorisms:120
Hippocrates: Pleuritis that does not clear up in fourteen days results in 
empyema.121
Galen: In pleuritis, acute fever with laboured breathing and cough and stabbing 
pain in the side are the essential signs by which we recognize the disease. 
Extension of the pain to the hypochondria or the collarbone are accessory, as is 
the greater ease of lying on the affected side rather than the other.
At ﬁrst glance Galen here appears to be as “Hippocratic” as one could wish, for his 
description of pleuritis has no explicit anatomical content: it is conﬁned to the realm 
of symptoms. Yet in fact his account is far removed from that of the Hippocratic 
texts, in two related respects. In the ﬁrst place, the actual symptoms he describes 
are not Hippocratic but “dogmatic”, for they include the very symptoms which the 
dogmatists had added to pleuritis, namely stabbing pain and the “greater ease of 
lying on the affected side”. Secondly, Galen conceives these symptoms as “signs by 
which we recognize the disease”, dividing these moreover into “essential signs” and 
“accessory” indications; and this conceptual grid, with its semiotic language, had no 
precedent in the Hippocratic writings.122 No doubt it is the anatomical conception 
of pleuritis, positing as it does that the disease is an internal and invisible process 
rather than a reported experience of the patient, which has required and called 
into being this semiotic conception. And although the crucial anatomical element 
is wanting here, it will be supplied in another of Galen’s commentaries, as we are 
about to see. What we should notice at this point is that by presenting this compact 
description of pleuritis within the context of his commentary on the Aphorisms, 
Galen has managed to identify the “pleuritis” of the later dogmatics, whose 
constellation of symptoms he is echoing, with Hippocratic “pleuritis”.
(2) Regimen in Acute Diseases:123
Hippocrates: ... Moreover, suppose the pain in the side continues and does not 
yield to the fomentations, while the sputum is not brought up, but becomes viscid 
without coction; should gruel be administered in these conditions without ﬁrst 
relieving the pain, either by loosening the bowels or by venesection, whichever 
of these courses is indicated, a fatal termination will quickly follow.
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Galen: Let us recall that Hippocrates wrote the discussion of pleuritis as an 
example, and that this was shown to occur through the inﬂammation of the 
membrane lining the ribs. If one give barley broth [i.e., gruel] at the height of 
the inﬂammation, he will harm the patient greatly.
Here Galen has elegantly stitched together Hippocratic medicine and anatomical 
medicine. By the end of his ﬁrst sentence he has established rhetorically that the 
“pleuritis” or “pain in the side” of Hippocrates was identical with the “pleuritis” of 
which Erasistratus and others wrote, that is, with “inﬂammation of the membrane 
lining the ribs”. Then, in the next sentence, he rephrases the advice of Hippocrates 
in appropriate anatomical language: where Hippocrates had written that gruel should 
not be given to patients in whom “the pain in the side continues”, adding a humoral 
gloss (“the sputum is not brought up, but becomes viscid without coction”), Galen 
reiterates the same warning but locates the time of danger — the danger of giving 
gruel —at “the height of the inﬂammation”. And thus does Galen establish a putative 
Hippocratic lineage for the anatomical conception of pleuritis.
These little pieces of commentary by no means exhaust what Galen had to say 
about pleuritis; on the contrary, he adverted to it in several other works.124 Although 
it is beyond my present scope to review all of Galen’s discussions of the disease, 
we must take note of the way he considered it in his writings on the pulse — for in 
these treatises Galen added a further diagnostic sign of pleuritis, one which he did 
not mention in his commentaries on Hippocrates. Speciﬁcally, Galen taught that 
pleuritis is characterized by a “hard” pulse, its hardness arising not from strength 
(for it is not in fact a strong pulse, even though it seems to be) but rather from 
the fact that it is fast and frequent (celer ... et creber).125 It is not clear whether 
Galen discovered this himself or whether he had derived it from earlier authors; 
the “hard” pulse as a diagnostic sign of pleuritis seems to have been unknown to 
the earlier dogmatists126 — even to Herophilus, the effective discoverer of the pulse 
and inventor of its diagnostic use127 — but it may have been Archigenes rather than 
Galen who made this innovation.128 At all events, the “hard” pulse was now added 
as yet a further characteristic of pleuritis. Amongst the implications of this was 
that pleuritis was readily distinguished from peripneumony; for the latter disease 
was associated with a very different kind of pulse, namely one which was “large”, 
“slow” and “soft” (magnus, languidus, mollis).129 Characteristically, Galen had 
a rationale for the pleuritic pulse: the reason that it was “notably hard” was that 
in pleuritis, “it is a nervous part which is affected”.130 Characteristically, too, he 
berated those “vulgar physicians” who were ignorant of the diagnostic use of the 
pulse,131 while conveniently omitting to mention the fact that this “ignorance” was 
shared by Hippocrates himself.
Galen’s persistent elision of the differences between Hippocratic medicine 
and dogmatic medicine serves as a ﬁtting ending to the strange tale of pleuritis 
in Antiquity. To reiterate, pleuritis began as a pain in the side, deﬁned by that 
symptom; subsequently it acquired an anatomical seat, and this necessitated not 
just a different suite of symptoms but also, and more fundamentally, a different 
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conception of the very nature of diseases and of symptoms; those who agreed in 
giving pleuritis an anatomical location nevertheless differed for several centuries as 
to whether it was seated in the lungs or in the hypezokos membrane; eventually 
it was placed in the membrane, though the reasons for this consensus remain 
obscure. And ﬁnally, in Galen’s hands, pleuritis changed yet again, in at least 
two ways. It now acquired a new sign, the hard pulse; and the very shift from a 
symptomatic conception to an anatomical one was obliterated, for an imaginary 
continuity was set up between Hippocratic pleuritis and the anatomical conception 
of pleuritis.
2.2. EARLY-MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PLEURITIS
2.2.1. Vesalius
It happened that pleuritis played a critical role in the life and work of Vesalius — 
for it was the treatment of pleuritis which was at issue in the book which marked 
his ﬁrst signiﬁcant break with the authority of Galen, namely his Venesection letter 
of 1539. The controversy over bleeding in pleuritis had begun a generation earlier, 
in 1514, when Pierre Brissot launched a typically Renaissance attack upon “Arab” 
bleeding practices in the name of Hippocratic and Galenic purity.132 Vesalius’s 
intervention of 1539 arose from his discovery as to the anatomy of the “azygos 
vein” (that is, the “unpaired vein”) and its branches: speciﬁcally, Vesalius had 
found that this single vein, which branched off from the vena cava on the right side, 
supplied the ribs of both sides (apart from the top three ribs). From this anatomical 
arrangement, and from the theory of phlebotomy as interpreted by Vesalius, there 
followed — so Vesalius argued — a new and decisive solution to the problem of 
where to bleed in pleuritis. For whether the pain was on the right side or on the 
left, and whether “derivative” or “reversionary” bleeding was desired, the pleuritic 
patient should always be bled from the right arm, since this was adjacent to 
the origin of all the costal veins.133 At least, this was where bleeding should be 
carried out if the patient’s pain was located in the lower nine ribs — and such 
was indeed usually the case in pleuritis, as Vesalius went on to argue, once again 
using anatomical reasoning.134 Thus Vesalius’s novel practice of dissecting for 
himself and of seeing (as he thought) with his own eyes had yielded its ﬁrst 
decisive fruit: it had resolved an important therapeutic problem which had troubled 
physicians for a generation.
But what was “pleuritis” itself? That is, what was the condition whose treatment 
was at issue here? A priori, we should surely expect to ﬁnd that Vesalius deﬁned 
“pleuritis” anatomically: not only in view of his vehement convictions as to the 
importance of anatomy in general, but also and more particularly because the entire 
rationale of his argument in the Venesection letter itself was anatomical. Yet we 
are in for a surprise, for in fact Vesalius deployed a symptomatic deﬁnition of 
pleuritis, and moreover he was at pains to argue against the anatomical deﬁnition 
of that illness:135
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It does not worry me that perhaps someone more contentious might contend 
that where I have included under pleuritis, pain in the loins or ilium I am 
using the expression “pleuritis” incorrectly. To him I shall reply that the name 
of this disease belongs to the category of those which are derived from the 
position of the primary lesion such as nephritis, peripneumonia, ophthalmia 
and coxendix. The name pleuritis will signify to me an affection of the whole 
side and not of the membrane lining the ribs alone, as many who ignorantly 
call that membrane the pleura believe.
Here Vesalius at first appears to class pleuritis amongst diseases which are 
anatomically-deﬁned — for what counts is “the position of the primary lesion”, 
and the analogues he cites are all seemingly anatomical: nephritis was doubtless 
located in the kidney (nephron), peripneumonia in the lungs, ophthalmia in the 
eyes, coxendix in the coccyx or its vicinity. Yet it immediately becomes apparent 
that the meaning of “position” and of “lesion” here is in fact not anatomical at all. 
For whatever we make of “nephritis” et al., Vesalius is locating pleuritis not in any 
particular organ or structure but on the contrary in the “side” of the patient, and in 
“the whole side” at that — that is, at a site deﬁned in terms available to the patient, 
and localized only diffusely. And Vesalius goes on to contradict the alternative view, 
inherited as we have seen from the ancients, that pleuritis was an affection “of the 
membrane lining the ribs alone”.136 With respect to pleuritis, then, Vesalius has in 
effect gone back not, as we might expect, to Erasistratus or to Herophilus (who 
became his models for anatomy once he had broken with Galen),137 but instead to 
Hippocrates,138 that is, to a pre-anatomical conception; and accordingly his preferred 
terms for pleuritis were dolor lateralis (pain in the side)139 and morbus lateralis 
(disease of the side).140 Finally, as the ﬁnishing touch to his rigorously symptomatic 
deﬁnition of pleuritis, Vesalius speciﬁcally contests the use of the word “pleura” 
for the membrane-lining-the-ribs. That is, it would seem that Vesalius, precisely 
because he deﬁned “pleuritis” as pain-in-the-side rather than an inﬂammation of 
the membrane in question, wanted to restore or reserve the term “pleura” as a 
name for the side of the body, rather than as a term for that membrane. (And he 
further asserted that “pleuron” as a term for a “primary position” did not mean 
“rib”; rather, he suggested that the Greeks had called the ribs pleurai merely 
“because they form the side”,141 which meant that “the side” was the true and 
original meaning of the Greek πλευρον.)
Now this terminological issue has taught us something more: that by the time 
of Vesalius, the membrane lining the ribs has acquired a new name. In the ancient 
world, that membrane had been called the “hypezocota” (or in Latin, the membrana 
costas succingens); but at some point since that time — we do not know when — it 
has come to be called, by some, the “pleura”. Further, Vesalius indicates that those 
who have thus re-named that membrane are just those who interpret the disease 
“pleuritis” as an affection of that same membrane. As we have seen, the act of 
locating pleuritis within the “membrana hypezocota” was the work of a vast ancient 
tradition, from Erasistratus in the third century B.C. to Aretaeus and Galen four 
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or ﬁve hundred years later; but the renaming of that membrane as the “pleura” 
has apparently happened since Galen’s time. (I have not established who it was 
that proposed or adopted this new term; in view of Vesalius’s hostility to it, we 
may presume that the “ignorant” re-namers of the membrane are men who do not 
know their Galen and do not dissect for themselves, but this leaves many possible 
candidates.)142 Of course all acts of anatomical naming, throughout anatomy’s 
complex and troubled history, are highly signiﬁcant: to a large extent anatomical 
discovery amounted to anatomical nomenclature, for anatomy was inherently 
concerned with a domain of experience which went beyond the bounds of ordinary 
language.143 But there is something very special about this particular re-naming: in 
this instance, the name of the part has apparently been inﬂuenced by the name of 
the associated illness. For the term which had originally referred to the patient’s 
side or rib, namely “pleura” (Greek pleuron) has so to speak migrated inwards, into 
the “hypezocota” — and this is the very path which had previously been traced by 
“pleuritis” itself. That is to say, the name “pleura” for that membrane is a piece of 
anatomical nomenclature which has followed in the footsteps of pathology.
True to the argument of the Venesection letter, Vesalius’s Fabrica of 1543 gave 
the membrane its ancient name, that is, in its Latin form, the membrana costas 
succingens.144 However, this was one battle which Vesalius lost; for by 1605, when 
Caspar Bauhin’s Theatrum anatomicum was published, the term “pleura” had 
become the standard name for the membrane.145 Just how and why this occurred I 
have not established; at least two alternative hypotheses suggest themselves. First, 
it is possible that the anatomical conception of pleuritis somehow came to prevail 
in the course of the late sixteenth century, and that this shift carried with it the name 
of the membrane: in other words, that Vesalius was defeated on both fronts. But 
second, there was in the late sixteenth century another and different development, 
which might also have led to the term pleura’s being preferred as a designation for 
that membrane. Speciﬁcally, by Bauhin’s time that membrane had acquired another 
layer, a layer which invested the lungs (just as the peritoneum had long been seen 
as investing the abdominal organs);146 and it is conceivable that this doubling of 
the membrane made the term “succingens” (undergirding) seem inappropriate. 
Whatever the reason, the anatomical aspects of the matter seem to have become 
consensual by the seventeenth century; for the double character of the membrane, 
and its naming as “the pleura”, have been routinely accepted ever since. But 
what of pleuritis? As we shall see, consensus was to prove much more elusive 
in pathology than in anatomy.
2.2.2. Baglivi
Vesalius surprised us by deﬁning pleuritis symptomatically when we expected him 
to deﬁne it anatomically; a century and a half later Giorgio Baglivi, in his De praxi 
medica (On the practice of medicine) of 1699, will spring upon us a complementary 
surprise. As it happened, pleuritis — in the English translation of 1723, “pleurisy” 
— was the very ﬁrst disease which Baglivi used to illustrate what he called the 
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“aphoristical way” of describing diseases.147 Thus in order to appreciate what 
Baglivi had to say about pleurisy, we need to take note of this “aphoristical way” 
and of its place in Baglivi’s larger argument. De praxi medica was just as much 
a Renaissance project as Vesalius’s earlier anatomical investigations had been,148 
for Baglivi’s central argument was that although the moderns had now excelled the 
ancients in medical theory, chieﬂy thanks to “experimental philosophy” and to the 
use of “geometrico-mechanical principles”,149 the ancients — which meant Galen 
as well as Hippocrates — were far superior to the moderns in all aspects of medical 
practice.150 And in line with this orientation, Baglivi presented his “aphoristical 
way” as a revival of the literary practices of Hippocrates.
Baglivi described the “aphoristical way” as consisting of “short sentences, tied 
up to no rules of method or scholastic subtlety, but clearly and openly delivered”151 
— this in contrast with what he called the “methodical way”, which “consists in 
tying it [physic] up to methods, and in digesting and adorning it with abstracted and 
useless notions”.152 The point of the “aphoristical way” was that it was a “loose” 
form of description, which precisely because of its unsystematic character left “void 
spaces ... for the insertion of the new and ever multiplicable voices of Nature”.153 
Baglivi associated the “aphoristical way” not only with Hippocrates but also with 
Bacon;154 and he presented it as the appropriate mode of recording for what he 
called the Medicina Prima — a concept which was surely meant to echo Bacon’s 
“Philosophia Prima”.155 The Medicina Prima, Baglivi explained, was “a pure 
history of diseases, obtained by sole observation at the sick man’s bedside, and 
related by the patients themselves”.156 Baglivi argued strenuously that this Medicina 
Prima — the very foundation of medicine — was “not to be met with in books”, 
because “the descriptions of diseases” to be found in books “are for the most part 
taken not from observation and matter of fact, but from the Authors’ Brains”.157 
As Baglivi deﬁned the Medicina Prima, in a passage which also introduced the 
accompanying Medicina Secunda, the “curative part”:158
The Medicina Prima is a particular science of a peculiar form, which does not 
owe its principles or improvements to other sciences, but ... depends upon a 
diligent and patient description of all such things as the learned observator 
has marked down concerning the invasion, progress and exit of diseases, and 
committed to writing, with the same simplicity and sincerity that he used in 
observing them, without adding any thing of his own, or of the doctrines of 
books or other sciences.... In effect, all that part called the Medicina Prima, 
which is the basis of the Medicina Secunda or curative part, ought to be treated 
of so as that it be derived from the true nature of things and not from the nature 
of our thoughts, as many have done....
Thus the Medicina Prima was to be developed by setting aside all theoretical 
conjectures and by constructing instead “a pure and exact History of Diseases, I 
mean such as shows from the very Nature of things and is described” — Baglivi 
reiterated — “by the patients themselves”.159 In short, the basis of the Medicina 
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Prima was empirical observations, of a kind which speciﬁcally and explicitly 
privileged the experiences of the patient; and the “aphoristic way” was the 
appropriate way of recording such observations.
Having extolled the virtues of the aphoristic method, Baglivi proceeded to 
illustrate it from his own experience. “Now the way of setting down the solid and 
reported observations of diseases in a short and aphoristical style”, he remarked, 
“will sufﬁciently appear from the succeeding diseases, which were examined by 
patient and repeated observations made in the Italian Hospitals”.160 There followed 
brief accounts of some twelve or so diseases, of which “a pleurisy” was the ﬁrst. 
From what has been said so far, we should surely expect that Baglivi deﬁned 
pleurisy symptomatically (since “a pure history of diseases” is “related by 
the patients themselves”), and that he did so strictly on the basis of his own 
experiences (that is, his “patient and repeated observations made in the Italian 
Hospitals”). Yet in fact Baglivi’s conception of pleurisy was straightforwardly 
anatomical — and his opening remarks followed Galen! Here is the ﬁrst paragraph 
of Baglivi’s account:161
Of a Pleurisy
If you would discover a pleurisy, place your chief care in observing the nature of 
the pulse. The hardness of the pulse is almost an infallible sign of all pleurisies; 
and while the pleurisies are sudden, or complicated with other diseases of the 
breast, if you observe a hardness in the pulse, i.e. too great a distension or 
vibration of the artery, tho’ the other signs are absent, you may assure yourself 
that the patient is under a pleurisy; for a hard pulse is an inseparable companion 
of all inﬂammations upon the nerves or membranous parts.
Obviously enough, both the hard pulse and its rationale echoed Galen (albeit 
with a slight modulation, from “a nervous part” to “the nerves or membranous 
parts”),162 and I shall attend to this seeming paradox in a moment. But what is just as 
important is the massive depth of taken-for-granted assumptions built into Baglivi’s 
remarks. To begin with, Baglivi simply assumed that pleurisy is an inﬂammation, 
and that his readers would share that premise; indeed, so tacit was this knowledge 
that he did not even trouble to spell out what he doubtless had in mind, that pleurisy 
consisted speciﬁcally in an inﬂammation of the pleural membrane. (We may surely 
infer that this was Baglivi’s meaning, for he classed pleurisy as one of the “diseases 
of the breast” — and signiﬁcantly, this appeared merely in an aside, which is 
another indication of how much he was taking for granted.) Similarly, he made no 
attempt to describe pleurisy’s characteristic suite of symptoms — “the other signs”, 
as he put it — for these too were common knowledge. Instead Baglivi concentrated 
upon just one sign, namely the hardness of the pulse, which he was privileging 
on account of its diagnostic power; and so too it emerged in the next sentence 
that “the difﬁculty of breathing” was a typical symptom of pleurisy, but this was 
mentioned speciﬁcally because of its special prognostic signiﬁcance. It seems, 
then, that Baglivi had no need to enumerate the full list of pleurisy’s symptoms, 
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for those symptoms were taken as implied by the very word “pleurisy”. Sure 
enough, Baglivi’s subsequent discussion,163 which was devoted to prognostics164 
and to therapeutics,165 mentioned several of those symptoms — fever, spitting, and 
(obliquely) pain-in-the-side — but always in passing, as things which were already 
well-known.166 In short, just as Baglivi could take it as read that pleurisy consisted 
in inﬂammation of the pleural membrane, so also he could assume that his readers 
were familiar with its characteristic signs and symptoms.
Thus Baglivi’s discussion of pleurisy exempliﬁed several times over the utter 
impossibility of his own project of pure observation, of what he called “diligent 
and patient description”, uncontaminated by “the nature of our thoughts”.167 In 
the ﬁrst place Baglivi, like any observer, was of course necessarily observing 
through inherited categories, categories which were so ingrained that he did 
not realize that they were categories: in this instance, the category “pleurisy”. 
Secondly, that particular category as Baglivi deployed it embodied the conviction 
that pleurisy consists in an inﬂammation of what had now come to be called the 
pleural membrane — a conviction which by its very nature derived not from “sole 
observation at the sick man’s bedside”, but on the contrary from “our thoughts”. 
It was of course this very conception of pleurisy, inherited from the later ancients, 
which Vesalius had contested in his Venesection letter. Evidently Vesalius’s attempt 
to restore the symptomatic conception of pleuritis had failed, at least in Baglivi’s 
particular setting; for the anatomical conception had somehow — we do not know 
how — attained the status of a convention. Indeed, so conventional had it become 
that Baglivi deployed it malgré soi: in the very attempt to illustrate his argument 
that medicine should be based on “a pure history of diseases, obtained by sole 
observation at the sick man’s bedside, and related by the patients themselves”, he 
actually deﬁned pleurisy in anatomical terms.
Thirdly, precisely the same was true of the diagnostic claim which Baglivi was 
putting forward — that “the hardness of the pulse is almost an infallible sign of all 
pleurisies”. For Baglivi justiﬁed this aphorism not by practical experience (either 
his own or that of others), but instead by appealing to underlying mechanisms: 
“a hard pulse is an inseparable companion of all inﬂammations upon the nerves 
or membranous parts.”
Last but not least, this rationale was itself derived from Galen, yet Baglivi 
was seemingly unaware of the fact. He could have acknowledged Galen as his 
source, and indeed this would have been grist to his mill: for De praxi medica 
bracketed Galen with Hippocrates as laudable ancients, accurate observers, and 
Baglivi was also at pains to detach the virtues of Galen himself from the vices of 
the “Galenists”.168 Yet as a matter of fact he did not mention Galen here; and the 
simplest explanation for this apparent oversight is that Baglivi had so internalized 
this particular Galenic message — perhaps derived from his teachers, rather than 
directly from Galen himself — that he really believed that it was his own observation. 
On this reading, it would seem that when Baglivi felt a hard pulse, he also and in 
the same moment felt an “inﬂammation upon the nerves or membranous parts”, and 
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speciﬁcally an inﬂammation of the pleural membrane. In other words, Baglivi had 
this particular doctrine of Galen’s literally in his ﬁngertips.
To sum up so far: In respect of pleurisy the medical men of the Renaissance 
inherited from the ancients two distinct conceptions, the one symptomatic (in the 
Hippocratic texts), the other anatomical (conveyed to them especially in Galen’s 
works). These two approaches were surely in tension with one another, and this 
is indeed what we have found; yet that tension expressed itself in very surprising 
ways. In the case of Vesalius, we would expect to ﬁnd the anatomical conception 
at work; yet in fact Vesalius deﬁned pleuritis in symptomatic terms, that is, as 
pain-in-the-side, and explicitly argued against the anatomical interpretation of the 
disease. And in the case of Baglivi, we would expect to encounter a deliberate 
application of the symptomatic deﬁnition; yet Baglivi actually deﬁned pleurisy 
anatomically, and moreover he did so quite unwittingly. In short, the relation 
between symptomatic and anatomical conceptions was remarkably subtle and 
complex — and this for just a “single” disease.
Nevertheless there seems to be a certain logic to the story of “pleuritis”: for to 
judge by all that Baglivi was taking for granted, it would appear that Vesalius had 
been defeated over the deﬁnition of pleuritis just as he was over the naming of 
the membrane. That is to say, it seems that the anatomical conception of pleuritis 
— in its “Erasistratean” form, with the Galenic addition of the hard pulse — 
had prevailed in the course of the Renaissance just as it had in later Antiquity. 
Once again, however, we are in for a surprise, as we shall see by turning from 
Baglivi to Morgagni.
2.2.3. Morgagni
Giambattista Morgagni’s De sedibus of 1761 was perhaps the most important work, 
and certainly one of the most original and profound works, in the whole Western 
medical tradition.169 What characterized that great book was not only the painstaking 
correlation of symptoms with post-mortem ﬁndings, for, in addition, De sedibus 
was a vast meditation upon the entire corpus of Western medical writings, from 
Hippocrates to Morgagni’s own day. Further, Morgagni’s historical sense was far 
more subtle and sophisticated than that of, say, Baglivi (with his naïve assertion 
that “Hippocrates speaks in the words of Nature, rather than those of man”)170 
or Boerhaave (with his Galen-like claim that Hippocrates was an anatomist).171 
Indeed, Morgagni dissected texts just as skilfully as he anatomized dead bodies 
and interpreted symptoms; that is, he was a master of analytical exegesis in three 
distinct domains: symptomatic, anatomical and textual. And the signal achievement 
of De sedibus was that it united these three layers or dimensions: that is, Morgagni 
systematically correlated (i) symptomatology with (ii) anatomy, meanwhile 
interweaving (iii) previous discussions of the disease in question. Consequently, 
De sedibus was a treasury not just of new observations but also of commentary 
upon old ones, stretching throughout Western medicine’s history. Yet the vast riches 
of the book remain largely untapped by medical historians, at least those writing 
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in English.172 In part this neglect reﬂects the inherent difﬁculty of the text, for 
Morgagni’s prose is at ﬁrst sight rebarbative and forbidding. At the same time, that 
neglect can be taken as a “symptom” (to use the obvious metaphor) of the very 
point which I am trying to argue: that medical history has strangely overlooked 
the history of medicine proper. Certainly there is a vast and troubling disparity 
between the recognized importance of De sedibus and the amount of attention that 
the book has received in English.173
But let us turn to Morgagni’s discussion of pleurisy, which appeared — along 
with peripneumony — in Letters 20 and 21 of De sedibus.174 (Letter 20 was 
concerned with the cases, dissections and observations of Morgagni’s erstwhile 
teacher Antonio Maria Valsalva; Letter 21 with those of Morgagni himself.) It will be 
helpful to begin by comparing Morgagni’s working deﬁnition of pleurisy with that 
of Baglivi, which we have just been examining. On the one hand, Morgagni differed 
radically from Baglivi in that he conceived pleurisy in rigorously symptomatic 
terms. On the other hand, Morgagni curiously echoed Baglivi in that he too took 
for granted the deﬁning symptoms of pleurisy: that is to say, he never listed those 
symptoms in a formal way, but instead let them emerge piecemeal in the course of 
his case-histories and discussions. Thus the implied premise of his account was that 
there existed a consensus as to pleurisy’s characteristic symptoms. We shall see in 
a moment what those allegedly-consensual symptoms were; ﬁrst it is important to 
notice why Morgagni deﬁned pleurisy symptomatically.
The point of Morgagni’s symptomatic deﬁnition of pleurisy was this: that the 
very theme which Baglivi had assumed (at least, in the particular case of pleurisy), 
namely the anatomical seat of the disease, was what Morgagni wanted to investigate. 
In this respect Morgagni’s approach to pleurisy was identical to his approach to 
diseases in general: he always deﬁned diseases symptomatically and then tied 
them to anatomical seats as indicated by dissection — accomplishing this link by 
means of an intricate logical operation which rested on the comparison of different 
individual case-histories.175 Hence the fact that Letters 20 and 21 of De sedibus 
were described as “the discourse of pain in the breast, sides, and back”, that is, as 
being concerned with experiences of the patient. And this gives us a good indication 
of the nature of Morgagni’s enterprise in general, and of his approach to pleurisy in 
particular. We have seen that pleurisy had been tied in Antiquity to the “membrana 
hypezocota”, that is, to the membrane which later came to be called the “pleura”, 
and that Baglivi had uncritically echoed this conception. But Morgagni, while being 
highly favourably disposed to anatomical localization, wanted to reopen the whole 
question as to the site of that localization. And for this purpose it was essential to 
begin with a strictly symptomatic deﬁnition, for only in that way could anatomical 
localization be investigated de novo as Morgagni was seeking to do.
The central symptoms-of-pleurisy which Morgagni was assuming, as best I can 
reconstruct them, were as follows (in purely arbitrary order):
(1) a “pungent” pain in the side, (2) a fever, (3) a hard pulse, and(4) difﬁculty 
in lying on the unaffected side. In fact the last symptom on this list was attended 
                                ON THE HISTORY OF DISEASE CONCEPTS   ·  301 
with certain complexities; for some patients, paradoxically, experienced difﬁculty 
in lying not on the unaffected side but, on the contrary, “on the pained side”. This 
anomaly occasioned a typically subtle and fruitful Morgagnian digression;176 but for 
present purposes we can ignore it, since Morgagni acknowledged that the difﬁculty 
was indeed usually in lying on the unaffected side, just as the ancient dogmatics had 
claimed.177 Now this occasional qualiﬁcation aside, Morgagni’s cluster of pleuritic 
symptoms was entirely conventional. Or to be more precise, Morgagni was here 
echoing those before him — from the later ancients to Baglivi — who had seated 
the disease in the “membrana hypezocota” / the “pleura”; for these were the very 
symptoms which had been identiﬁed by that anatomical tradition. Thus Morgagni’s 
implicit deﬁnition of pleurisy overlapped with both Vesalius’s conception and 
Baglivi’s conception, while differing from them both. Like Vesalius, Morgagni 
deﬁned pleurisy symptomatically — but Vesalius’s symptomatic conception had 
been Hippocratic (pleuritis is pain-in-the-side), whereas Morgagni’s conception 
followed that of the dogmatic tradition (pleuritis is a constellation of symptoms, 
of which pain-in-the-side is only one, and that pain is speciﬁcally “pungent” 
in character). And like Baglivi, Morgagni drew his suite of pleuritic symptoms 
from the dogmatic tradition, including the “hard pulse” which Galen had added 
— but Baglivi had deﬁned pleuritis anatomically, whereas Morgagni deﬁned 
it by its symptoms.
In short, Morgagni accepted that deﬁnition of pleurisy’s symptoms which had 
been constructed by the ancient “dogmatic” tradition stemming from Erasistratus 
and culminating in Galen; but he put in suspense the anatomical localization which 
had been decreed by that same tradition, precisely because his purpose was to 
reconsider the site of pleurisy’s localization. And in effect — to oversimplify brutally 
what was an immensely complex and subtle discussion — Morgagni took up again 
the very argument which had raged between Erasistratus et al. and Herophilus et 
al., that is, the question as to whether pleurisy is seated in the membrane lining the 
ribs (which had now, of course, become a double membrane named the pleura)178 
or in the lungs. To this end he carefully compared the symptoms and post-mortem 
ﬁndings of pleurisy (traditionally seated in the membrane) with those associated 
with peripneumony (traditionally seated in the lungs). And he came up with the 
answer that pleurisy and peripneumony were not distinct diseases at all; rather, 
they were two aspects of a single disease, which Morgagni called pleuripneumony. 
Yet he did not present this conception as his own invention; rather, he ascribed it 
to his Paduan predecessor of the early seventeenth century, Vincent Baronius.179 
In short, the effect of Morgagni’s argument is that the very category of pleurisy 
is a mistake, and that this has been known — albeit forgotten — for over a 
century! Notice Morgagni’s rhetorical tactics: he could, of course, have begun with 
Baronius, but instead he chose to end with him. What he actually began with was 
the symptomatic content of the standard deﬁnition of pleurisy; and the point of 
this vast opening concession was that it rendered all the more forceful his eventual 
demolition of that deﬁnition.
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In Morgagni’s hands, then, pleurisy has literally disappeared: it is no longer a 
distinct disease at all. Rather, it is a mistaken interpretation of certain symptoms, 
symptoms which commonly (but not always) go together, and which are sometimes 
(but by no means always) associated with inﬂammation of the pleural membrane. 
So too peripneumony as conventionally conceived has to be re-thought, for the 
distinction between pleurisy and peripneumony is invalid. The real disease, 
pleuripneumony, is an inﬂammation of the lungs which is associated with various 
and irregular complications, such as the exudation of fluid, adhesion of the 
pleural membranes, and — as just one such complication amongst many others 
— inﬂammation of those membranes. Depending on the precise course of the 
disease in the particular patient, different patterns of symptoms are observed; but 
those patterns called “pleurisy” and “peripneumony” are merely arbitrary, for the 
supposed differences between them are often contradicted in particular cases. And 
danger to the patient arises not from the involvement of the pleura but solely from 
the inﬂammation of the lungs. Furthermore, these seemingly heretical doctrines are 
in fact consistent with all that has been learnt about pleuritis and peripneumony, 
both in Antiquity and since — as Morgagni shows through a careful contemplation 
of the medical writings of the ancients and moderns alike.180
Incidentally we should notice that by introducing us to Baronius, Morgagni has 
also muddied the waters of the previous stage of our story. We saw earlier that 
between the lifetimes of Vesalius and Baglivi, the meaning of “pleuritis” apparently 
stabilized much as it had done in later Antiquity: that is, it became an inﬂammation 
of the “pleura”, the two-layered descendant of the membrana hypezocota. But 
now that we have come across Baronius, it is clear that the history of “pleuritis” 
between about 1550 and 1700 involved further complexities. Was Baronius 
responding to a previous debate? By what methods did he arrive at his concept of 
“pleuripneumony”? Was his work simply forgotten, was it debated and explicitly 
rejected, or was it in fact received more positively than Baglivi and Morgagni 
have led us to assume?181 Such questions give concrete form to what we already 
know on grounds of principle: that an adequate history of “pleurisy” would require 
us to investigate a host of intermediate ﬁgures between Vesalius and Baglivi 
(not least Baronius), and for that matter, between Baglivi and Morgagni (for 
instance, Boerhaave).182
So too we could, of course, pursue the history of pleurisy after Morgagni. And 
if we were to take up the later history of pleurisy, we would ﬁnd that Morgagni’s 
discussion was by no means decisive; for in fact both pleurisy and peripneumony 
survived his putative dissolution of the distinction between them. Subsequently, in 
the hands of Laennec, pleurisy changed yet again, seemingly remaining within the 
pleural membrane yet with several novel twists. As the inventor of the stethoscope, 
Laennec found for pleurisy a distinctive auscultative sign, namely “egophony”, 
a bleating sound as of a goat;183 he therefore accorded special importance to the 
physical state which he took that sound to reﬂect, namely an effusion of ﬂuid in 
the thoracic cavity;184 further, pleurisy’s other signs and symptoms were rather 
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different from those which Morgagni had deployed;185 and last but not least, Laennec 
distinguished between “pleuritis” and “pleurisy”, for pleuritis was inﬂammation 
of the pleural membrane, whereas pleurisy was the larger disease-condition which 
such inﬂammation produced.186 Nor did pleurisy in this new form achieve stability; 
for as we learn from Russell Maulitz’s study of pleurisy in the Paris clinique of 
the 1830s,187 Laennec’s immediate successors such as Auguste François Chomel 
redeﬁned pleurisy/pleuritis yet again.188 Although they still regarded inﬂammation 
of the pleural membrane as deﬁnitive, it seems that they placed particular diagnostic 
emphasis upon the pleuritic pain;189 they certainly loosened the tie between that pain 
and the pleural effusion,190 thereby diminishing the pathognomonic signiﬁcance 
of Laennec’s egophony;191 and they linked pleurisy with phthisis (tuberculous 
consumption),192 whereas Laennec had made a point of separating pleurisy from 
phthisis.193 (Notice too that this link between diseases of the pleural membrane and 
of the lungs was quite different from that which Morgagni had sought to establish 
— for Morgagni had connected pleurisy with peripneumony, not with phthisis,194 
and there is no indication that Chomel and his colleagues were seeking to dissolve 
pleurisy as Morgagni had done.) And meanwhile the clinicians of the 1830s were 
applying to pleurisy, as to other diseases, the new statistical methods introduced 
by Pierre Louis,195 thereby adding a novel analytic dimension which Laennec 
had barely envisaged,196 and which was of course quite alien to Morgagni’s focus 
upon individual case-histories.197
Thus throughout the three centuries from the Renaissance to the Paris “clinic”, the 
history of pleurisy reveals a repeated refusal of closure. Vesalius sought to restore a 
symptomatic deﬁnition of the disease, but he apparently failed in this just as he did 
in his attempt to preserve the Hippocratic meaning of “pleura”/”pleuron”; Baglivi 
took it for granted that pleurisy was an inﬂammation of the pleural membrane (now 
membranes, plural), but Morgagni demolished this conception and dissolved the 
very being of pleurisy; Morgagni’s account, for all its rigour, did not persuade his 
successors; Laennec tied pleurisy to the “egophony” revealed by his stethoscope, but 
this bond was immediately weakened. Indeed, it is doubtful whether pleurisy ever 
stabilized; but that is a question for another study, as is the associated and equally 
intriguing issue as to the meaning, or meanings, of pleurisy today. What is clear is 
that in the ﬁrst two thousand years and more of pleurisy’s history, any such stability 
of its meaning was always temporary and contingent.
3. CONCLUSION
What larger implications might follow from this all-too-incomplete survey of 
pleurisy’s history? I suggest that eight points stand out.
First, my ﬁndings underline once more what was demonstrated long ago by 
Temkin (for all the limitations of his conception), by Canguilhem and above all by 
Fleck, and has been conﬁrmed by various investigations in the last twenty years 
or so: namely that concepts-of-disease comprise an eligible domain for historical 
investigation in their own right. That domain is distinct from — though by no means 
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independent of — such more familiar history-of-medicine themes as the history of 
anatomy and of theories of normal bodily function. More particularly, it is quite 
different from the exercise of retrospective diagnosis; for retrospective diagnosis 
suppresses precisely what the history of disease-concepts brings to the fore, namely 
the content of past descriptive and diagnostic categories.
Second, this particular historiographic theme is not only possible but is also 
uniquely appropriate: it is in the literal sense proper to the history of medicine, 
since the business of medicine was-and-is to do with human illnesses. Indeed, the 
history of concepts-of-disease takes us to the very heart of medicine’s history: for 
of course it was those very concepts that determined what medical practitioners 
saw, and which thus deﬁned what medicine actually was. In short, the history 
of disease-concepts is just that segment of the history of ideas which is medical 
history’s distinctive and special concern.
Third, to judge by the example of pleurisy, the history of disease-concepts is 
rich with possibilities and has many unexpected twists and turns. When I embarked 
on this investigation, in blissful ignorance of Wesley Smith’s pioneering study 
published over ten years earlier, I had expected to ﬁnd a simple transformation of 
pleurisy from symptomatic to anatomical, and I was vaguely locating that putative 
transformation in the eighteenth century, or perhaps in the early nineteenth century, 
with the work of Bichat. In only one respect did those expectations prove correct: 
for while there was indeed a shift from a symptomatic conception to an anatomical 
one, it had taken place (as I learnt from Professor Smith’s essay) over two thousand 
years earlier than I had thought, it was by no means simple, and it did not produce 
the closure that I was assuming. And my subsequent explorations have yielded 
further surprises at every point — for instance ramifying from pathology into 
anatomical discovery-and-nomenclature, and repeatedly raising the problem 
as to how medical consensus was established, if indeed such consensus was 
established at all.
Fourth, as has just emerged, this subject is by no means bounded by the 
history-of-ideas conception to which I have restricted myself here. On the contrary, 
both shifts and stability in the concept of pleurisy, or of any other disease, raise 
explanatory questions which could be addressed only by a widening of focus, a 
shift of attention outwards from the concepts themselves to the many other matters 
which might have inﬂuenced them — for instance, practices of healing and of 
pedagogy, corporate relationships, patronage networks, religious and philosophical 
allegiances. Indeed, one of the attractions of a history of disease-concepts is that 
it can provoke us to connect the cognitive and the social dimensions of medicine’s 
history198 — precisely in line with Fleck’s conception of knowledge.
Fifth, and relatedly, the history of disease-concepts brings into play the 
perspectives of both patients and doctors, and what is more, it necessarily combines 
those perspectives. It is now, of course, well-recognized that medical history 
embraces the viewpoint of the patient as well as that of the practitioner.199 And 
concepts-of-disease as an historiographic theme hold out the promise of enriching 
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this insight, for one might well say that those concepts were and are the very ground 
upon which those two viewpoints come to meet and merge.200 This is well attested 
by what we have seen of pleurisy’s history, for while the various deﬁnitions of 
the disease all emanated from medical practitioners, those deﬁnitions always bore 
some imprint of the patient’s experience, even if (as with Baglivi’s conception) 
only in attenuated form. To recapitulate, “pleuritis” began as neither more nor less 
than an experience of the patient; its symptomatic content was actually enlarged — 
remarkably enough — by the adoption of an anatomical deﬁnition; and even in 
the Paris clinic of the 1830s, the supreme site of the anatomical conception of 
illness, the patient’s experience in the form of pain-in-the-side retained a crucial 
diagnostic signiﬁcance. In short, just as the sufferings of patients are the very 
occasion for medicine, so the history of disease-concepts entails attention to 
those sufferings and to the dialectic between the patient’s experience and the 
practitioner’s categories.
Sixth, the case of pleurisy has put in a very different light the picture developed 
in Foucault’s Birth of the clinic. We saw at the outset that Foucault’s programme 
was putatively constructed along strictly syntactic lines, and that this approach, 
were it actually possible to implement it, would foreclose the very possibility of 
writing a history of disease concepts; and now that we have glimpsed how complex 
was the development of the concept of “pleurisy”, it has become only too apparent 
what a wealth of possibilities Foucault thereby excluded. But this is by no means all, 
for pleurisy’s history radically qualiﬁes the substantive story of Birth of the clinic. 
For one thing, pleurisy shows that the kind of anatomical localization pursued by 
Bichat — the siting of diseases not in the organs but in the “membranes” or “tissues” 
— had a model which began in Antiquity. For another, the shift in Antiquity from a 
symptomatic deﬁnition of pleurisy to an anatomical conception was associated with 
a transformation of medical categories just as radical as the “mutation in discourse” 
associated with la clinique itself. And ﬁnally, the relation between a medicine of 
symptoms and a medicine based on anatomy was far more complex than Foucault 
supposed: for rather than the one giving way to the other, whether in the years 
around 1800 or at any earlier point, the two were in productive tension for almost 
the entire history of Western medicine, that is to say, from the time of Herophilus 
and Erasistratus onwards. Nor was that tension abolished by la clinique — for 
as Jacalyn Dufﬁn has recently shown, Laennec himself was deeply aware of the 
limitations of the very anatomico-clinical conception which he did so much to 
consummate,201 and we have seen that the relation between symptoms, signs and 
anatomy continued to trouble his successors of the 1830s.
Seventh, the history of concepts-of-disease is a ﬁeld of vast scope. To begin 
with, we have at our disposal literally hundreds of diseases whose history could 
be traced; but this, which we might call “special pathology history” (the history of 
concepts of particular diseases), is only part of the subject. For there also beckons 
the possibility of “general pathology history”, that is, the history of pathological 
theory at large; and the latter theme, which was the very concern of Canguilhem’s 
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The normal and the pathological, is every bit as important as “special pathology 
history”. As just one illustration of the many opportunities that present themselves in 
“general pathology history”, we may take the case of eighteenth-century nosology. 
Although Foucault rightly drew attention to nosology in Birth of the clinic, and 
although it has attracted a handful of studies since that work appeared, we still 
remain almost wholly in the dark as to the origins of nosology (just why did 
Sauvages invent it?);202 about its relations with traditional “pathology” (how exactly 
did nosology differ from pathology?);203 about the sites of its success and failure 
(which medical schools used nosologies in their teaching, and which did not?);204 
about its mutations and inﬂections in the course of the eighteenth century (how and 
why did Pinel’s “nosographic” categories differ from the “nosological” categories 
of Sauvages or of Cullen?); and last but not least, about its historical impact (was 
nosology, as Foucault argued, the essential preliminary to la clinique, or was it, as 
Porter has suggested, of little or no long-term signiﬁcance?).205
Finally, the history of disease-concepts is a theme which should lend itself to 
comparative investigation. For instance, to stay for convenience with the example 
of pleurisy, we might ask: is there any analogue of pleurisy in Chinese medicine or 
in Ayurvedic medicine?206 Have Ayurvedic practitioners and Chinese practitioners 
encountered “pain in the side” at all, and if so, how have they described it, interpreted 
it and treated it? It is of course beginning to be recognized that “history of medicine” 
can no longer be narrowly equated with the history of Western medicine alone; but 
historians of medicine have not found it easy to bring different medical traditions 
within a common focus, because the cognitive structures of those traditions 
are so very different. But concepts of disease, with their necessary focus upon 
patients’ experiences, hold out the promise of establishing points of intersection 
between different diagnostic categories, which should shed light upon the larger 
conceptual styles which characterize each of the three great medical systems. 
And it may be ventured that such a comparative perspective will make still 
clearer the historically-constructed character of disease-concepts in the Western 
tradition itself.
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as to how “consensus” over the ECG was reached (ibid., 72).
18. S. J. Peitzman, “From Bright’s disease to end-state renal disease”, in Rosenberg and Golden 
(eds), Framing disease (ref. 15), 3–19.
19. Ibid., 9, 11, 16.
20. The most notable exception is A. Cunningham, “Transforming plague: The laboratory and the 
identity of infectious disease”, in A. Cunningham and P. Williams (eds), The laboratory 
revolution in medicine (Cambridge, 1992), 209–44.
21. C. Quétel, Le Mal de Naples (Paris, 1986); History of syphilis (transl. by J. Braddock and B. 
Pike, Cambridge, 1990). “Syphilis as a cultural phenomenon” is the title of the introduction 
(pp. 1–8).
22. Ibid., 53, 67, 75, 81, 108.
23. This from the Oxford English dictionary — for characteristically, Le Mal de Naples does not 
mention the meaning of the term.
24. “Thus syphilis came to be recognised as syphilis, gonorrhoea as gonorrhoea” (Quétel, Le Mal 
de Naples (ref. 21), 111). Cf. and contrast Fleck, Genesis and development of a scientiﬁc 
fact (ref. 1), 7–8.
25. The point is touched upon just once and in passing: Quétel, Le Mal de Naples (ref. 21), 97.
26. Fleck, Genesis and development of a scientiﬁc fact (ref. 1), 41. See also, for instance, pp. 15–16 
(“The discovery of the causative agent, Spirochaeta pallida, was the result of steady, logical 
work by civil servants”), 22, 69–70. For a general formulation see p. 123: “the true creator of a 
new idea is not the individual but the collective.”
27. Ibid., 98.
28. Ibid., 99.
29. These mechanisms involved a spectrum of communication-media, from what Fleck called “journal 
science”, through “vademecum science” and “textbook science”, to “popular science”: see 
ibid., 111–25. At one extreme, “journal science”, which is precisely the “vanguard” of science 
(p. 123) is “provisional, uncertain, and personally colored” (p. 119); at the opposite extreme, 
“popular science” entails “valuation” (p. 113), “simplicity” and “vividness” (p. 115). The key 
intermediate category was “vademecum science” (pp. 119–24), which represents the “collective, 
generally valid” aspect of research science (p. 120), and “requires a critical synopsis in an 
organized system” (p. 118, Fleck’s emphasis); on this see refs 31, 34 below.
30. Ibid., 112.
31. Ibid., 122–3. Here I am simplifying Fleck’s picture, for at this point he was in fact discussing 
“vademecum science” rather than “popular science”. However this simplification is not 
inappropriate, for three reasons. In the ﬁrst place, Fleck argued that popular science has a 
“general epistemological signiﬁcance”, since its qualities of “certainty, simplicity, vividness” are 
precisely the goals of “the expert” as well (pp. 114–15) — whence the fact that “the conviction 
that there is no development of thought”, which as we see below is characteristic of popular 
science, is “a conviction that also inﬂuences the expert” (p. 116). Secondly, vademecum science 
and popular science as Fleck depicted these have many features in common: for instance, 
vademecum science resembles popular science in seeking to constitute a “closed system” (p. 
119); in involving “exoteric” as well as “esoteric” knowledge (p. 123); and in constructing 
a mythical, individualised history (pp. 122–3; cf. p. 116, as quoted immediately below). 
Third, Fleck described vademecum science as developing out of “journal science” through 
processes of communication, including the stabilising of nomenclature (pp. 120–3); and 
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he had already insisted that “Every communication and, indeed, all nomenclature tends 
to make any item of knowledge more collective and popular” (p. 114, Fleck’s emphasis). 
See also ref. 34 below.
32. Ibid., 116 (here referring to “popular science” itself).
33. On the same page Fleck reproduced a potted history of syphilis (from Gottstein’s book of 
1929) and commented: “From descriptions such as this, the conviction emerges that there 
is no development of thought.”
34. Ibid., 120–1. Strictly speaking, this anecdote concerning retrospective diagnosis was presented not 
as an aspect of “popular science” but rather within Fleck’s account of “vademecum science”, 
and not as a characteristic of such science but rather for a speciﬁc technical reason (i.e., as 
an illustration of the collective, “impersonal”, origin of collectively-accepted concepts). But 
my appropriation of Fleck’s brief discussion of retrospective diagnosis is, I submit, consistent 
with the claims he had already made about the apprehension of “syphilis” in “popular science” 
(p. 116). See also ref. 31 above.
35. Ibid., 82–83, 165.
36. Ibid., 140; cf. p. 111 (ref. 24 above).
37. For a rare exception whose very brevity conﬁrms the rule, see ibid., 5–6.
38. Above, at ref. 20.
39. For example, the main reference work on the history of science cites Fleck’s work three times, in 
each case as a major conceptual resource, whereas the comparable (and substantially longer) 
reference work on the history of medicine refers to Fleck only once, and even then as what 
amounts to an addendum on the history of Fleck’s own ﬁeld, immunology. See respectively 
R. C. Olby, G. N. Cantor, J. R. R. Christie and M. J. S. Hodge (eds), Companion to the 
history of modern science (London, 1990), 64, 91, 164, and Bynum and Porter (eds), 
Companion encyclopedia of the history of medicine (ref. 6), 203. Even Cunningham’s ﬁne 
essay “Transforming plague” (ref. 20 above), the central historiographic point of which is 
entirely consonant with Fleck’s approach, does not cite Fleck. Fleck was ﬁrst noticed in 
English by T. S. Kuhn, The structure of scientiﬁc revolutions (Chicago, 1962), pp. vi–vii; 
the 1979 English translation was produced at the behest of historians and sociologists of 
science, notably R. Merton.
40. See for instance G. Brieger, “The historiography of medicine”, in Bynum and Porter (eds), 
Companion encyclopedia of the history of medicine (ref. 6), i, 24–44, p. 31.
41. Temkin, The Falling Sickness (ref. 2), Preface, p. vii, my emphasis.
42. R. Koch, The aetiology of tuberculosis (German original 1882; transl. by Dr and Mrs M. Pinner, 
New York, 1932), 44. Tuberculosis was originally “consumption” or “phthisis” (touched upon in 
refs 110 and 194 below); Koch’s redeﬁnition of the disease transformed its meaning in complex 
ways, precisely in line with what Fleck was to write about syphilis (above, at ref. 13).
43. M. Foucault, Naissance de la clinique (Paris, 1963); Birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical 
perception (transl. by A. M. Sheridan Smith, London, 1973).
44. See for instance D. Armstrong, Political anatomy of the body: Medical knowledge in Britain in 
the twentieth century (Cambridge, 1983).
45. Foucault, Birth of the clinic (ref. 43), pp. x, xv, xi.
46. For “imaginary investments” see ibid., p. x.
47. Mutatis mutandis, the same is true of N. Jewson’s classic study, “Medical knowledge and the 
patronage system in eighteenth-century England”, Sociology, viii (1974), 369–85.
48. Foucault, Birth of the clinic (ref. 43), p. xi.
49. Ibid., p. xi; my emphasis.
50.  Ibid., pp. xvi–xvii.
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52. Thus for all that Foucault consistently distanced himself from structuralism, his archaeological 
oeuvre is open to precisely the kind of critique that P. de Man levelled at structuralism in various 
of his works; see for instance Blindness and insight: Essays in the rhetoric of contemporary 
criticism (ﬁrst edn, 1971; revised edn, London, 1983); Allegories of reading: Figural language 
in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust (New Haven, 1979); and The resistance to theory (ed. 
by W. Godzich, Minneapolis, 1986). See further the penetrating discussion of Foucault in S. 
Burke, The death and return of the author: Criticism and subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and 
Derrida (Edinburgh, 1992; 2nd edn, 1998).
53. Figlio, “Chlorosis and chronic disease in nineteenth-century Britain” (ref. 4).
54. Ibid., 173–5.
55. Ibid., 175.
56. Ibid., 193.
57. See respectively pp. 178 nn. 32, 34; 181; 185; 174 n. 21; and many subsequent citations 
(Black’s medical dictionary).
58. Ibid., 174–5.
59. See for instance ibid., 179: “Constructing the illness ... was the other face of discovering 
adolesence.”
60. Notably at ibid., 177–8, invoking Laslett’s argument that the age of menarche declined in 
the nineteenth century.
61. See for instance F. Boissier de Sauvages, Nosologia methodica sistens morborum classes juxta 
Sydenhami mentem and botanicorum ordinem (2 vols, Amsterdam, 1768), ii, 440–3.
62. F. H. Garrison and L. T. Morton, A medical bibliography: An annotated check-list of texts 
illustrating the history of medicine (4th edn, Aldershot, 1983), 418–19.
63. Rosenberg and Golden (eds), Framing disease (ref. 15).
64. Charles E. Rosenberg, “Framing disease: Illness, society, and history”, ibid., pp. xiii–xxvi, 
at pp. xiv–xv.
65. Cf. above, at ref. 42. On the shifting meanings of “cholera” and on the problems attending 
retrospective diagnosis of “tuberculosis”, see M. Grmek, Diseases in the ancient Greek world 
(transl. by M. Muellner and L. Muellner, Baltimore, 1989), 7, 183–4. The latter work, it 
should be observed in passing, has an ambiguous significance in relation to my theme. 
On the one hand, it rests entirely upon retrospective diagnosis and pays little attention to 
ancient disease-concepts — thereby participating in the naturalist-realist tradition. On the 
other hand, Grmek stresses throughout (for instance, in the passages just cited) that modern 
concepts of disease are incommensurate with ancient ones — this in harmony with the 
historicalist-conceptualist approach.
66. See further Rosenberg, “Framing disease” (ref. 64), p. xvi, where this anti-relativist position was 
reiterated. Here the argument became rather more complicated, for Rosenberg rightly argued 
that “the process of disease deﬁnition” merited attention, thereby seemingly abandoning the 
framing metaphor. See also ref. 68 below.
67. For instance an essay on silicosis, bearing the promising title “The illusion of medical certainty”, 
nevertheless began by asserting — with no intended irony — that “Silicosis is a chronic lung 
disease caused by the inhalation of silica dust”. G. Markowitz and D. Rosner, “The illusion of 
medical certainty: Silicosis and the politics of industrial disability, 1930–1960”, in Rosenberg 
and Golden (eds), Framing disease (ref. 63), 185–205.
68. Similarly, when introducing Peitzman’s essay Rosenberg summarized its argument by saying 
that “the evolving framework of pathological assumptions describing and explaining ‘Bright’s 
disease’ has been gradually integrated and reintegrated into a series of differently focused 
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“It is precisely this process of deﬁnition and redeﬁnition that demands scholarly attention”. 
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framing-and-pictures, was immediately (and commendably) undermined by the notion of 
“deﬁnition and redeﬁnition”. See Rosenberg and Golden (eds), Framing disease (ref. 63), 
4, and cf. ref. 66 above.
69. Until recently an analogous situation obtained within the sociology of medicine, the scope of which 
was traditionally restricted by giving a particular twist to the supposed distinction between 
“illness” and “disease”. “Illnesses”, it was said, were the subjective experiences of patients; 
they fell within the realm of “culture”, and were therefore seen as forming a proper theme for 
sociological inquiry. “Diseases”, in contrast, were conceived as real pathological processes, 
taken to coincide with their (supposed) medical deﬁnitions; they were regarded as inhabiting the 
realm of “nature”, and therefore as lying beyond the bounds of sociological investigation. For 
this point, and for a cogent argument against this framework of assumptions, see P. Atkinson, 
Medical talk and medical work: The liturgy of the clinic (London, 1995), chap. 2. The burden 
of Atkinson’s argument is that just as diseases are the constructs of medicine, so the supposed 
objectivity of those diseases was the construct of traditional medical sociology itself. Like 
Rosenberg, Atkinson has deliberately avoided the term “construction”; but signiﬁcantly, he 
replaces it not by “framing” but instead by “production” (ibid., 45); and unlike Rosenberg, he 
refers to Fleck (pp. 143, 147). Similar points had already been made, from a rather different 
perspective (concerned with the sociology of illness rather than the sociology of knowledge), 
by R. Dingwall, Aspects of illness (London, 1976), chap. 2. As for the “illness”/”disease” 
distinction, both words are so elastic that it can be made in many different ways, or avoided 
altogether, according to one’s rhetorical purposes: see A. L. Caplan, H. T. Engelhardt, Jr, and J. 
M. McCartney (eds), Concepts of health and illness: Interdisciplinary perspectives (Reading, 
Mass., 1981), and C. Currer and M. Stacey (eds), Concepts of health and illness and disease: 
A comparative perspective (Leamington Spa, 1986).
70. S. Shapin, “History of science and its sociological reconstructions”, History of science, xx 
(1982), 157–211, p. 157.
71. Smith, “Pleuritis” (ref. 5). I thank Professor Smith for e-mailing me a copy of this paper and of his 
translations from the ancient texts, and for helpfully discussing my various queries.
72. Foucault, Birth of the clinic (ref. 43), 122.
73. Smith, “Pleuritis”, quoted here from typescript.
74. Particularly the Aphorisms (below, at ref. 121).
75. Regimen in acute diseases (below, at ref. 123).
76. This was the thrust of the discussions of pleuritis in Diseases I (the work known to Galen as Internal 
suppurations): 26 and in Places in man: 14. See respectively the Loeb edn, Hippocrates, 
v (transl. by P. Potter, London, 1988), 98–183, pp. 166–71, and Smith, “Pleuritis” (ref. 5), 
Appendix. This aspect also appeared in Affections: 7, which however was one of the texts that 
did deﬁne pleuritis, as next discussed.
77. Affections: 7. See Loeb edn, Hippocrates, v, 6–91, pp. 15–16.
78. Diseases II: 44–46. See Loeb edn, Hippocrates, v, 191–333, pp. 262–7.
79. Diseases III: 16. See Loeb edn, Hippocrates, vi (transl. by P. Potter, London, 1988), 6–63, 
pp. 38–57.
80. Ibid., 38–39; Smith’s translation, in the appendix to his “Pleuritis” (ref. 5).
81. Loeb edition, Hippocrates, vi, “Index of symptoms and diseases”, 336.
82. Ibid., translator’s note, 334.
83. Diseases I and Places in man, as cited in ref. 76 above; Aphorisms, quoted below, at ref. 121.
84. See below, at ref. 123; Smith, “Pleuritis” (ref. 5), 3–4; and D. Jacquart, “Theory, everyday practice, 
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and three 15th-century physicians”, Osiris, 2nd ser., vi (1990), 140–60, p. 154.
85. Below, at ref. 87.
86. Here my reading differs from that of Smith, “Pleuritis”, who characterizes Diseases III as 
discussing “a single disease with various manifestations”.
87. Diseases II: 44–46 (Loeb edn, Hippocrates, v, 264–7); cf. above, at ref. 85.
88. In one text only, namely Places in man: 14, pleuritis was given an internal anatomical location, 
speciﬁcally in the lung. This work was also unique in conceiving pleuritis as the one-sided 
version of peripneumony: “When both sides are painful and the affections of both sides are 
similar, that is peripneumony; the other is pleuritis” (Smith’s translation, “Pleuritis” (ref. 5), 
Appendix). Although many of the Hippocratic texts discussed pleuritis and peripneumony 
in sequence and offered overlapping therapies for them, they usually deﬁned them in quite 
different ways. In particular, pleuritis was always deﬁned with reference to pain in the side, as 
we have seen; but the deﬁning symptoms of peripneumony were fever, cough and expectoration, 
with pain being mentioned only erratically. In short, the entire thrust of the discussion of 
pleuritis and peripneumony in Places in man was well outside the Hippocratic mainstream. 
(Accounts of peripneumony appeared in Affections: 9, Diseases I: 27, and Diseases II: 47, all 
in Loeb edn, Hippocrates, v; see pp. 17, 171, 267–9.)
89. Traditionally, Praxagoras is regarded as the teacher of Herophilus. With respect to the localization 
of pleuritis, Diocles may well have preceded Erasistratus, though this is not to say that he 
was Erasistratus’s teacher. The possible roles of Praxagoras and (especially) Diocles in the 
story of pleuritis are discussed by Smith, “Pleuritis” (ref. 5); here, however, as a convenient 
simpliﬁcation, I shall depict the anatomical tradition as stemming from Herophilus and 
Erasistratus, setting aside Praxagoras and Diocles. (The views of Diocles and Praxagoras on 
peripneumony are quoted in ref. 92 below.)
90. Caelius Aurelianus, Acute diseases, II.xiii–xxiv, in I. E. Drabkin (ed. and transl.), Caelius 
Aurelianus: On acute diseases and On chronic diseases (Chicago, 1950), 181–227, chap. 16 
(pp. 189–93). In fact, my claim that the dogmatics “deﬁned” pleuritis in anatomical terms is a 
projection backwards from stage (iii) of ancient medicine (see below, particularly the discussion 
of Aretaeus at ref. 115); strictly speaking, it is possible that the dogmatics deﬁned pleuritis 
in symptomatic terms and added an anatomical seat (or rather, seats). But for convenience 
I am eliding this particular subtlety.
91. On peripneumony cf. ref. 88 above.
92. “In the case of people suffering from peripneumonia, Diocles says the veins of the lung are affected, 
while Erasistratus says the arteries are affected, and Praxagoras the parts of the lung which are 
joined to the spine. But Herophilus says the whole lung is affected. If the patients [also] suffer 
from fever, he says, it causes pleurisy.” Caelius Aurelianus, quoted in H. von Staden, Herophilus: 
The art of medicine in early Alexandria (Cambridge, 1989), 378 (T.215). Cf. Caelius Aurelianus, 
Acute diseases, ed. by Drabkin (ref. 90), II.xxviii (p. 231).
93. This emerges from a passage from Galen’s De locis affectis, as discussed by Smith in “Pleuritis” 
(ref. 5).
94. Caelius Aurelianus, Acute diseases, ed. by Drabkin (ref. 90), II.xiv [91] and II.xvi [96–98] 
(pp. 185, 189–91).
95. With a interesting qualiﬁcation: that those who placed pleuritis in the membrane, or some of them, 
apparently believed that “some patients ﬁnd it impossible to lie on the side affected, while others, 
on the contrary, rest more easily on that side”: ibid., II.xvi [98] (p. 191). To complicate the matter, 
the justifying argument does not match the claim itself, as Drabkin observes in an editorial 
footnote. This very issue would be revived by Morgagni: see below, at ref. 176.
96. Ibid., II.xvi [96] (p. 189).
97. Ibid., II.xvi [98] (p. 191). Also of interest is the passage which records the views of Soranus 
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/Caelius himself, for here there emerged an additional dimension of this symptom, one which 
I have not encountered in any other text: “when they turn on the opposite side they experience 
pain and actually feel the inﬂamed organs hanging and being drawn down by their own weight”: 
ibid., II.xiv [91] (p. 185), emphasis added.
98. Caelius Aurelianus, Acute diseases, ed. by Drabkin; above, at ref. 73.
99. Cited below, from ref. 120 onwards.
100. Aretaeus, On the causes and symptoms of acute diseases, in F. Adams (ed. and transl.), The extant 
works of Aretaeus, the Cappadocian (London, 1856).
101. For the original Greek and Latin words see Drabkin’s introduction (ibid., pp. xi–xxvi, at 
p. xix).
102. In the case of cardiac disease Soranus/Caelius was anti-localist (ibid., II.xxxiv, 257–61, p. 
259); with respect to hydrophobia, he adopted an intermediate position (III.xiv, 371–5, 
pp. 374–5).
103. Ibid., II.xvi [100] (p. 193).
104. It should be mentioned, however, that Soranus’s (Caelius’s) citations of Hippocrates were somewhat 
haphazard and erratic: see ibid., Drabkin’s note 1, p. 62 and note 10, p. 353.
105. Ibid., II.xix [113–24] (203–15).
106. Smith, “Pleuritis” (ref. 5), 5.
107. Ibid., 6–7.
108. “Stimulosus ac pulsuosus et igneus”: Caelius Aurelianus, Acute diseases, ed. by Drabkin (ref. 
90), II.xiv [91], 184.
109. ‘Nygmatodes’ (νυγµατωδηζ) is so translated in R. J. Durling, A dictionary of medical terms 
in Galen (Leiden, 1993).
110. The tricky issue concerns the term ‘nygmatodes’, used by Galen to characterize the pains of 
pleuritis. Aretaeus also used this word in connection with pleuritis, but he did so not in his 
generic description of the disease but rather as a sign that it had progressed to empyema: 
see Aretaeus, Acute diseases, ed. by Adams (ref. 100), I.x, 17 (Greek), 257 (English). Thus 
for Aretaeus, pains of the “nygmatodes” type were in fact characteristic not of pleuritis, but 
of empyema. And it would appear that Soranus had done something similar; for in Caelius 
Aurelianus’s Latin rendition, he wrote that the transition from pleuritis to empyema is 
associated with “pungent pains” (dolore pungenti), as distinct from the pain of pleuritis 
itself, which in this particular context he described not as “pungent” but merely as “acute” 
(dolor acutus): see Caelius Aurelianus, Acute diseases, ed. by Drabkin (ref. 90), II.xvii 
[101–2] (p. 194). If (as later usages indeed imply) the Latin pungens was equivalent to the 
Greek nygmatodes, then the account of Soranus/Caelius differs from that of Galen much 
as that of Aretaeus does.
111. See above, at ref. 86.
112. On Archigenes see further below, at ref. 128.
113. This is Wesley Smith’s interpretation. The matter is complicated by the relation between 
the “pricking” quality of the pain and the progression of pleuritis to empyema: see ref. 
110 above.
114. Immediately after announcing the conclusion that “it is the hypezocos membrana which is the seat of 
this disease”, Soranus/Caelius added: “And this membrane is the source of severe pains (dolorem 
vehementem), for it is ﬁbrous and attached to the side.” This came within a passage framed 
as a summary of the views of those who place pleuritis in the “hypezocos membrana”, which 
indicates that Soranus/Caelius was here paraphrasing Erasistratus et al. See Caelius Aurelianus, 
Acute diseases, ed. by Drabkin (ref. 90), II.xvi [98–100] (pp. 191–3).
115. Aretaeus, Acute diseases, I.x, ed. by Adams (ref. 100), 16, 255–6; word-order modiﬁed slightly.
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116. This with the phrase “all these symptoms”, in the third sentence.
117. Foucault, Birth of the clinic (ref. 43), 137; A. Cunningham, “Getting the game right: Some 
plain words on the identity and invention of science”, Studies in history and philosophy of 
science, xix (1988), 365–89, pp. 373–5.
118. Cf. M. Heidegger, Being and time (German original 1928; transl. from the 7th German edition by J. 
Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Oxford, 1962), section 7, p. 52, and below, at ref. 122.
119. See W. D. Smith, The Hippocratic tradition (Ithaca, N.Y., 1979). For a different reading see 
J. Longrigg, Greek rational medicine: Philosophy and medicine from Alcmaeon to the 
Alexandrians (London, 1993).
120. Aphorisms, V.viii (cf. also xv), in Loeb edn, Hippocrates, iv (transl. by W. H. S. Jones, London, 
1931), 98–221, p. 159; Galen, Commentary on Hippocrates’ Aphorisms (17B 399 K.), as cited 
and translated by Smith, “Pleuritis” (ref. 5).
121. Contrast the translation in G. E. R. Lloyd (ed.), Hippocratic writings (Harmondsworth, 1978/1983), 
222: “If sufferers from pleurisy do not cough up material within fourteen days, the inﬂammation 
produces empyema.” The “inﬂammation” here appears to have been interpolated by the 
translators (J. Chadwick and W. N. Mann). On the transition of pleuritis to empyema, compare 
Aretaeus’s discussion (ref. 110 above).
122. Although certain of the Hippocratic texts had speculated as to the internal events underlying pleuritis 
(see above, at ref. 76), they had not installed these posited internal events as deﬁnitive of the 
disease; rather, the disease was identiﬁed as its symptoms. Hence the fact that those symptoms 
were never turned into “signs”; nor indeed were they conceived as “symptoms” in our sense (cf. 
above, at ref. 118), for they lay on the same ontological level as the disease.
123. Hippocrates, Regimen in acute diseases: 16, in Loeb edn, Hippocrates, ii (transl. by W. H. S Jones, 
London, 1923), 75; Galen, Commentary on Regimen in acute diseases (15.488 K) , as cited and 
translated by Smith, “Pleuritis” (ref. 5).
124. Smith, “Pleuritis” (ref. 5) discusses several of these passages.
125. Galen, De causis pulsuum, IV.viii, in F. Blondel and A. Le Moine (eds), Hippocratis Coi, et 
Claudii Galeni Pergameni archiatron opera (13 vols in 9, Paris, 1639–89), viii, 223–5; De 
praesagitatione ex pulsibus, IV, ibid., 298–9; De pulsibus ad tyrones, cap. xii, ibid., 8–9; Galeni 
Synopsis librorum suorum de pulsibus, ibid., 326.
126. So we may infer from the fact that the Soranus/Caelius passage cited earlier (above, at ref. 90) made 
no mention of the pulse in connection with the dispute over the localization of pleuritis.
127. See von Staden, Herophilus (ref. 92), 262–88. All observers credited Herophilus with the basic 
pulse-nomenclature, but none of them mentioned the “hard” pulse (or its opposite, the “soft” 
pulse) amongst the various terms he had developed.
128. It seems that the terms “hard” and “soft” pulse were introduced by Archigenes (see Galen, De 
pulsuum differentiis, III.vii, in Blondel and Le Moine (eds), Hippocratis et Galeni opera 
(ref. 125), viii, 77–79); but it is unclear whether Archigenes had applied these terms to the 
particular cases of pleurisy and peripneumony. On Galen’s debts to Archigenes in respect 
of pulse-lore, see von Staden, Herophilus (ref. 92), 284 n.156; on Archigenes and pleuritis 
see above, at ref. 112.
129. Galen, De causis pulsuum, IV.xii, in Blondel and Le Moine (eds), Hippocratis et Galeni opera 
(ref. 125), viii, 227; De pulsibus ad Tyrones, cap. xii (ibid., 10).
130. Galen, De causis pulsuum, IV.viii, in ibid., viii, 224.
131. Ibid., viii, 223.
132. J. B. Saunders and C. D. O’Malley, Andreas Vesalius Bruxellensis, The Bloodletting Letter 
of 1539: An annotated translation and study of Vesalius’s scientific development (New 
York, 1946), 15. See also A. Cunningham, The anatomical renaissance: The resurrection 
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of the anatomical projects of the ancients (London, 1997), 101–2, 110–11. The issue had 
medieval precedents: see Jacquart, “Theory, everyday practice, and three 15th-century 
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